Of Free Riders and Forced Riders: America's Cup edition

We're all familiar with the typical free rider problem. If there's some public good, individual incentives to contribute towards its funding are attenuated by non-excludability: if you benefit from the good whether or not you pay for it, why pay? And so we get all kinds of arguments for government provision of various public goods.

A couple of days ago, my former Econ 224 student Brennan McDonald sagely suggested that the America's Cup bid be funded via Kickstarter. Economists know that most of the "economic benefits" case for these things is, as Shamubeel Eaqub so precisely put it, bullshit. What's left then? If the fun from a big party outweighs the cost, fine. Otherwise, not. Brennan then suggests:

If we host the next America’s Cup, Kickstarter or some other sort of crowd-funding is the only responsible choice. We should be forcing these special interest groups to put their money where their mouth is. I’m sure that a non-trivial proportion of Kiwis would donate to such a campaign. The deal with council and government could be that if you reach $XX million in voluntary contributions, we’ll streamline the resource consents necessary.

I think Brennan's largely right here. Kickstarter's pretty well placed for funding things that provide warm glow benefits, though they're not the only one. I gave some money to the Indegogo campaign for SeaSteading's current fundraising initiative; I'll get a polo shirt to wear. Actually, a third identical blue polo shirt with a nice Seasteading crest. I get warm glow and get to show affiliation, they get money, I get some prospect-theory-based utility.

Will Taylor then raises the usual objection:

@EricCrampton @brennansmacro @tvhe agree, though free-rider problems would be an issue.
— Will Taylor (@WillTaylorNZ) September 18, 2013

Yup, free-riding still could be an issue even for a decent Kickstarter. If we don't make payment mandatory, we'll get some free-rider problems from those who enjoy the benefits but refuse to pay. Sure. And I'm certain that Will here is simply raising the theoretical point rather than taking it as an argument for state funding of yacht races. However, others would use this argument as justification for state support: free-riding on a public good can provide reason for funding.

But there's a necessary complement to free-rider problems. If we do make payment mandatory through taxes, we'll get a forced rider problem: lots of people who get epsilon, zero, or negative utility from the yacht race are forced to pay for it through their taxes. I would currently be willing to pay $50 for the America's Cup to simply cease to exist; I'd pay more to abolish the Olympics. I hate the America's Cup. It clogs up tv, the Twitter Stream gets a bunch of unblockable nonsense added into it, radio blather gets worse. The America's Cup is almost intolerable being held a Pacific Ocean away; it would be unbearable in Auckland. At least it wouldn't be held in Christchurch.

Yes, I'm being ornery and maybe I'm exaggerating just a little. But worries about free-riders' benefiting from the America's Cup without paying lead people to force me to pay for stuff I do not want and the abatement of which I would view as a good. I wouldn't really push a button to abolish these things because I can't know that I wouldn't be doing more harm than good. But none of the darned boosters seem to give a hoot about whether they're doing more harm than good when they want to force everybody to pay for their parties. That's why they keep trying to frame this nonsense in "aggregate economic benefit" terms - so that they can pretend that even people who don't like the Cup get some notional benefit from it. And the merits of that argument were succinctly summarised by Shamubeel.

Free-riders can be a reason for government funding of public goods. It's possible for the aggregate true willingness-to-pay for something to exceed the cost of provision but for the payment not to be forthcoming because of non-excludability. But for stuff like the America's Cup, it's entirely plausible* that the losses from impositions on forced riders exceed, by orders of magnitude, the gains from avoiding free-rider problems. Please let's not go about creating political failures that are worse than the purported market failures they seek to solve.



* James Zucollo asks for evidence that forced rider problems will here be greater than free rider problems. I'll confess that I haven't gone around and run surveys on it. But surely the onus ought to be on those who would use force to compel my payment for a yacht race to prove that the thing creates rather than destroys value. And it's not that hard to turn Brennan's suggestion of Kickstarter into something more like Alex Tabarrok's Dominant Assurance Contracts. In that system, everyone who pledges towards the Kickstarter gets some small reward for their pledge whether or not the Kickstarter raises enough money to activate. If the campaign raises enough money, everyone has to pay up for their pledge. But because everyone is rewarded for pledging regardless of whether the project goes ahead, free-riding problems are reduced. Maybe it's not perfect as you still need some high demanders fronting a bit of cash for the up-front payments to supporters, but it's a decent way of reducing free-rider problems while avoiding forced-rider problems. That boosters of major events typically go for compulsion first suggests, to me at least, something about their expectation that individuals have more than notional demand for these kinds of things.

I'm having a rather harder time imagining how you run a Kickstarter for "No America's Cup Bid For New Zealand". Sure, I can imagine a site taking donations. But where a pro-Yacht Kickstarter would actually pay for the event, an anti-Yacht Kickstarter would have to be providing something to the governing coalition in order that they not go ahead with an America's Cup bid. It couldn't just donate to the National Party as too many potential donors would be put off by that and because Parties can't actually be seen to be selling policy. Instead it would likely have to be providing some desirable-to-the-government public good but only in the case that there's no Cup bid.

Update: I've been informed that if New Zealand wins the racing, the next America's Cup will be held in New Zealand. While I still think this is better funded by Kickstarter if it does go ahead, it's seeming increasingly likely that there might be me and maybe two other people in the country who might be annoyed by having to pay for a yacht race. A lot of people seem to be getting utils out of this thing. And while I think that this makes it way more likely that you could get a million people each shelling out $10 - $15 to support the cup in exchange for exclusive supporter t-shits, it also means that Zucollo could be right: losses from forced riders could be low. Bread and circuses are popular.

Other people's money

When you're playing with other people's money, you have different incentives. Take Corporate Social Responsibility, for instance.

Suppose that there's a trade-off between profitability and CSR mandates. Why might this be the case? Any CSR initiatives that increased profitability would have already been adopted under normal profit-seeking strategies.

Managers want to think themselves good people and enjoy doing CSR things. They get approbation from others for doing so. They'll get in trouble with shareholders if profitability drops too much, so they won't do the nuttiest things. But they'll take some CSR as consumption.

NBER points to some relevant evidence. From the abstract of Cheng, Hong and Shue's new paper:

We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility. First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness. We use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership. Firms with moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue). Second, increasing monitoring reduces corporate goodness. A regression discontinuity design of close votes around the 50% cut-off finds that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness.

In short, the more skin that decision-makers have in the game, the less they go for CSR policies. And the more that those with skin in the game can monitor the decision-makers, the less they go for CSR policies. It's slack in the principal-agent relationship that allows managerial consumption of "do-good" benefits.

Sometimes, we need Larry the Liquidator.

Ladies and Gentlemen... the Greens' would-be Finance Minister

Russel Norman, recently ruled out as Finance Minister in any Labour-Green coalition by Labour, tweets from the Finance Committee:

Sitting in Finance Cttee listening to Treasury officials describe tax as a 'burden'. Right wing political ideology runs deep in Treasury!
— Russel Norman (@RusselNorman) September 17, 2013

Tax is price we pay to live in a civilised society. If Treasury thinks it's a 'burden', perhaps they'd suggest abolition of public health.
— Russel Norman (@RusselNorman) September 17, 2013

Taxes are a bad, public services are a good. Saying the first doesn't mean denying the second.

More importantly, economists use the word 'burden' in a particular way. A few useful notes about Principles-level (maybe intermediate) economics for someone who thinks himself qualified to be finance minister:

• 'Burden' measures the total cost of a tax. The 'excess burden' is the amount by which the cost of a tax exceeds the amount collected. Treasury tends to reckon that excess burden is around 20%: it costs us about $1.20 to raise $1.00 in tax. The $1.00 raised is a transfer from the public to the government; the $0.20 is pure loss due to distortions in economic activity consequent to increases in our current mix of taxes.
• Tax incidence theory is important: it tells us who bears the burden of any particular tax. Suppose we wanted to add another 5% compulsory Kiwisaver contribution. The 'burden' of the tax would fall on both workers and on employers with the precise mix depending on how employers and employees change their labour demand and labour supply with changes in wages: it doesn't much matter whether we say that employers have to pay it or whether employees have to pay it. Regardless of statutory incidence, economic incidence - the burden - will remain the same. Meteria Turei understood this when she said that the accommodation supplement paid to tenants is largely a subsidy for landlords. Alas, public understanding of such things is imperfect, allowing for shenanigans where measures imposing burdens on one group are framed as costing somebody else instead.
• If a genie appeared able to provide public health services, for free, this would be a good thing, right? It's impossible, but it would be good. The services paid for by taxes are good, the taxes are bad. We need to be sure that the value delivered by services are greater than the burden imposed by the tax. At current measures of excess burden, a project must return at least $1.20 for every dollar in spending. 

Russel Norman suggests only "right wing" economists talk about tax burden. Here is a JSTOR search on "tax burden". There are 61 pages of search results with 100 results per page. Item number 177 on a date-sorted list is famous Right Wing Economist John Maynard Keynes discussing the Colwyn Report on Natinoal Debt and Taxation. Item 398 is rabid right-winger Nicholas Kaldor's call for wage subsidies to reduce unemployment (1936).

Burden is just the term used by economists to describe the cost of the tax and to help sort out the difference between statutory and economic incidence. Like "While X writes the cheque to IRD, the burden of the tax falls on Y and Z." That's it. It's the standard term used in the main texts to describe this thing. Richard Musgrave (centre, maybe centre-left) uses it. James Buchanan (right) uses it. Pick a random public finance text, you'll find "tax burden" or "excess burden" somewhere in it.

Update: egads, it gets worse. Lance Wiggs tries explaining that it's just a word we use. Russel Norman replies:

@lancewiggs Taxes do change behaviour. To call it a burden or distortionary does buy in to general equilibrium model w all its problems
— Russel Norman (@RusselNorman) September 18, 2013

Update 2: this is way too funny. A Twitter correspondent points me to two press releases by Russel Norman.

First:

"It's not fair to expect income-earning New Zealanders to carry a disproportionate share of the tax burden while some of New Zealand's wealthiest individuals pay none," said Green Party Co-Leader Russel Norman.

Second:

Unlike the National Government that has chosen to shift the tax burden on to the lowest paid New Zealanders, our tax changes would focus on those not currently paying their fair share.

Some advice for David Cunliffe.

Dear David,

Congratulations on winning the leadership of your party. Now the hard work begins. By that, I don’t mean uniting your party; I mean persuading the electorate that you are offering a coherent alternative to National, particularly on economic policy. Now I am an economist not a political commentator, but it seems to me that there are a few principles you need to follow that have been missing from your party over the past five years:

1. Ask yourself in private, what do you really stand for? Politics is the art of the possible. But this should mean asking what desired outcomes you have to give up on in order to be in a position to implement the ideas that really matter to you. Too often in recent years, it has seemed like your party has based its manifesto purely on what it thinks would maximise its chances of winning an election without any thought about why it wants to win.
2.  You will need to sacrifice some principles for populism; that is the nature of democratic politics. But you should aim to form a government that can win more than one election and will be judged well by posterity and so resist the temptation to cynically promote policies you know to be damaging. Your party’s 2011 promise to remove the GST from fresh fruit and vegetables was an example of such a policy.
3.  As a corollary of point 2, minimise your use of bad economics. Regrettably, bad economics can often be good politics, but too much—in particular excessive promising of free lunches—will be seen as non-credible by the electorate.
4.  In particular try to appear to be operating from consistent principles, not just offering to scratch the latest political itch. Your colleague, Clayton Cosgrove, recently and quite correctly in my view, castigated the government for paying a subsidy to Rio Tinto to keep the Tiwai Point aluminium smelter open. Three days earlier, you gave a speech as part of your leadership race in Dunedin in which you castigated the same government for “gutting” the Hillside Workshops in Dunedin. Campaigning against National’s corporate welfare could be a strong election plank for you, but not if you simultaneously criticise National for not having enough of it.
5. This means, you should take economics seriously. Don’t take your advice from courtiers seeking to flatter or consultants prepared to provide any answer you are prepared to pay for. Your party’s recent fiasco in which you repeatedly cited the Wolak report as justification for your electricity policy only to have Frank Wolak repudiate your claims, was an entirely predictable outcome of your not having sought to understand the report before citing it.

Follow these points, and you could be leading a party that operates with a few core principles and with policy proposals that follow logically from those principles. And that would certainly be a way to distinguish yourself from your political opponents!

The scream test

Imagine two policies.

Policy A would have government nationalise all liquor companies and distribute their product, for free, for anybody who wants some, with costs borne out of general taxation. There would be no compensation of the liquor companies.

Policy B would strengthen alcohol intervention programmes for prisoners with alcohol abuse problems. They'd spend a fair bit on it and work hard with prisoners, both while in prison and during their re-integration back into the community, to help them to avoid falling back into substance abuse.

Now Alcohol Action NZ proposes a "scream test" to tell whether some proposed policy would reduce alcohol harm. In their model, industry profits are increasing in the harm imposed by alcohol, and industry screams when profits are threatened. Anything that reduces harm reduces profits, so the scream test tells us which policies are likely to reduce harm.

I suggest instead that industry would scream a lot about Policy A, and would likely support Policy B. I also suggest that Policy A would increase harm and Policy B would reduce harm. Note further that National is already implementing something like Policy B - kudos to them. I've yet to hear screams from industry.

The scream test is a bad one. Profits are perhaps increasing in total consumption, but they're likely decreasing in alcohol's harms not only because of the policy reaction function but also because moderate consumers' consumption is likely decreasing in perceptions of harm.

The one spot where Sellman's scream test could be right would be policies potentially hitting the very heaviest consumers. There are discrepancies between median reported consumption figures and total alcohol available for consumption suggestive of that there is a small group consuming booze by the barrel. Policies disproportionately hitting that group could potentially reduce both harm and profits. But I hardly expect that mandatory 1 am bar closing times fit the bill.

TANSTAAFR

Ladies and gentlemen, the Owlbear song.

Geek cred to the first commenter explaining my cryptic title and the problem in Marcotte's song to which it alludes.

Marcotte's D&D works are up on Spotify (and here and here). Listen to them during your next campaign.

HT: my search on Spotify for the word "Owlbear". This is the only song that came up. If you need to ask why I'd have searched Spotify for Owlbears, you've not been reading me long enough.

Information failures and risky buildings

There's a trade-off when government agencies disclose known risks. Take, for example, AIDS disclosure laws. Some US states require that partners or others likely to be at risk from a patient testing positive for HIV;  others fear that the effect of such disclosure laws is to induce those at risk to avoid being tested. I've certainly not seen any data sufficient for running that cost-benefit analysis,* but it's plausible that either regime could be the correct one.

Wellington Council has a list of buildings sharing the same design flaw as the collapsed CTV building in Christchurch. But they won't tell anybody which buildings are on that list. Is this likely to be efficient? It depends on how Council knows and what they do with the information. If these kinds of flaws get found when Council officers dig back through the old building plans, then there's little risk that disclosure induces building owners to hide flaws. If they're found instead when owners inform Council, then disclosure could induce owners to keep quiet. So, in the former case, disclosure makes sense. In the latter case, it's a trade-off. Whether it makes sense to keep things quiet then depends on the number of owners who would likely be deterred from revealing risks in the disclosure regime and on whether Councils actually do anything to ensure that risky buildings are made safe. If buildings of that sort fall under the usual "you have 30 years to fix it" rule, then it seems unlikely that we're doing much good by keeping things quiet. If they're working towards much quicker repairs of disclosed faults, and if we think that tenants would overreact to the risk disclosure, and if we think that building owners would hide faults in a disclosure regime, then perhaps non-disclosure makes sense.

I'm inclined to agree with NoRightTurn that the case for disclosure seems strong - and especially since the justification seems to be to avoid imposing losses on the owners of risky buildings rather than to avoid that other owners notify Council of building deficiencies. But I'd reverse that call if it turned out that Council were really pushing to get this fixed and if there were substantial risk from unknown building flaws that would fail to be notified under a disclosure regime.

* This state-by-state variation seems eminent fodder for empirical work on the effects of disclosure laws on testing rates. File under "future honours projects" if it's not already been done.

Still seeing red: Blame the rules not the ref

I really, really hate 15 on 14 rugby. Three years ago, I wrote a venting post when in the space of five All Black tests we had seen 3 yellow cards and 1 red. On Saturday night in the test match between the All Blacks and South Africa, we saw that quantity in a single game, three for foul play and one for a professional foul. 

The first yellow card to Bismark Du Plessis was clearly wrong; the second to the same player was clearly correct (as were the cards to Nonu and Read) according to the rules. The problem was that the rules state that a second yellow card automatically leads to a red, and so the original error was compounded and South Africa had to play most of the second half one man short, to the detriment of the game. 

Most of the discussion in the main-stream media and social media since has focused on the error by Roman Poite in carding Du Plessis for what was a perfectly legal tackle. This misses the point. Yes, Poite made was in error*, but errors are inevitable. Rugby is played at a furious pace. Split second judgements are required from both players and referees and all of them are going to make mistakes. The rules need to be written with a view that this is going to happen. The two-yellow-equals-a-red rule is simply too draconian to a world where errors of judgement can happen. 

Part of the problem, here, is that there isn't any coherence in the incentives that the rules seek to create. Partly we want to punish individual players for behaving in a reckless way causing unnecessary endangerment to other players. Partly we want to punish teams for illegal actions of individuals that give their team an advantage. For the latter, it is appropriate that the punishment lead to an advantage for the other team in the course of the game being played. For the former, the punishment can occur after the game in the form of suspensions, fines, etc. If the point of a card is to put a team at a disadvantage to mitigate the advantage caused by some illegal act, why does it make a difference if the same player transgresses twice, or two players from the same team transgress once each? And if the point of the two-yellows-equals-a-red rule is to increase the punishment for habitual offenders, why does it make a difference if that player earns a yellow card once in two successive games or two yellows in a single game? 

I come back to the rule I suggested in my 2010 post: If foul play merits sending a player off, let him be replaced so the game continues to be 15 on 15, but take appropriate action at the post-match judiciary (including being open to the possibility that the on-field decision by the referee was a mistake). If the problem is professional fouls, change the incentives so that conceding a penalty does not give the infringing team an advantage in terms of possession and field possession, and instruct referees to be more liberal in awarding penalty tries. But please, no more 15-on-14; it is a blight on the game. 

* As an aside, why has the criticism all been placed on Poite rather than, George Ayoub. Poite made a call based on what he saw; he asked for guidance from Ayoub, the television match official. Ayoub instead of clearly stating that there was no foul play simply said that he couldn't make a determination and that Poite should go with the call as he saw it. Ayoub had the benefit of slow motion, multiple replays and different angles; Poite did not. Why, then, is Poite the one blamed? 

Competition in small markets

Another for the "New Zealand's Fixed Costs Matter" file: Aaron Schiff posts on the relative lack of competition in New Zealand. Where inefficient firms are driven from the market in other places, New Zealand has a long tail of pretty unproductive outfits.

Roger Procter has dug into the stats a bit deeper and found that some New Zealand firms have very high productivity but there is a very long tail of unproductive firms that are able to survive.

He notes that the ratio of the productivity of the firm at the 90th percentile (i.e. near the top) to the 10th percentile (bottom) of the productivity distribution in New Zealand industries is around nine.

In other words, a firm that is nine times less productive than the best in the same industry can survive in New Zealand. In Denmark, for example, the ratio is reported to be around 1.6 to 3.5. Danish firms that can’t achieve at least a quarter of the productivity of the best firms get killed off quickly.

Roger argues, and I agree, that lack of competition is a major reason for this. Competition forces firms to increase productivity and kills off those that don’t.

Aaron agrees with Procter's assessment that New Zealand's low level of international trade hurts things, then makes a rather interesting argument for import-led growth.

We’re stuck in a low-competition, low-productivity, low-trade equilibrium. New Zealand domestic markets are too small to support enough intense competition to get us out of this state. Exporting is hard work and not enough firms are motivated (or forced) to drag the economy up the productivity mountain.

On the other hand, if low cost imports from productive foreign firms start coming in, maybe NZ firms will be forced to improve their game, or get killed off.

I realise this is a harsh “stick” type strategy, rather than an export “carrot”. Exports create jobs and imports can destroy them, at least temporarily. Maybe I’m getting soft in my old age but there might need to be assistance for some workers during the transition. But given the dire productivity stats, maybe a strong shock to the system is required.

There's not a lot that we can do to make New Zealand even more open to imports: tariffs are very low, GST rules around imports currently make sense, and we see no need for the New Zealand government to enforce at the border any exclusive dealing arrangements that foreign manufacturers have seen fit to make with New Zealand retailers. But getting rid of our ability to run parallel importing, or doing dumb things imposing GST on low-value imports, or forcing a policy preference for New Zealand Made products, would do harm.

Taking less offence - revisited

Loyal readers will recall that New Zealand's Broadcast Standards Authority decides which words are particularly offensive by surveying New Zealanders. Alas, where they once ran face-to-face surveys asking them which of a series of pretty rude terms were particularly offensive, and in which contexts, they now run it via an internet panel survey. I had no end of fun imagining Eric Cartman volunteering to run a door-to-door version of the survey.

The BSA's 2013 list came out this week. It's called "What not to swear: the acceptability of words in broadcasting, 2013". They warn that the report contains language that some would find offensive. There hasn't been great changes in acceptability since 2009; the 2009 figures showed a fairly substantial increase in tolerance of robust language as compared to 1999.

One interesting bit from their summary:

• When comparing the different demographic groups, it is evident that
  
  • Males tend to be more accepting of the words than females
  • Younger respondents tend to be more accepting than older respondents
  • Those that state they have no religion tend to be more accepting than those of religious belief
  • Those of Māori ethnicity are generally more accepting than those of other ethnicities, while Pacific peoples are less accepting
  • Those on high household incomes tend to be more accepting

I wish they'd run some regressions rather than just comparisons of means. Pacific groups tend, in New Zealand, to be lower income and more religious. Are differences between Pacific responses to swearing based on religious differences between Pacific and Maori groups, or something else?

I try to set the dial, for lecturing, to avoid terms considered offensive to a majority in the context of "people being interviewed (TV or radio)".

The very very best part of the report is Appendix I, where respondents were invited to fill in those terms that they personally found offensive. They make a point of reminding readers that the comments are copied verbatim. Words typed in range from "goodgracious" and "Doodoohead" and "OMG, Oh My God" to very creative spellings of other terms. Just go read it. And imagine what you'd have added in, had you had the chance. Please do not contribute suggestions in the comments though. We're not that kind of blog.

We remain impressed by the robustness of language frequently heard on broadcast television, after 8:30, in New Zealand.

Living Wages - Canadian economist(s) edition.

Simon Collins's Herald piece on living wages makes for interesting reading.

He opens with a story of a couple who both work shifts cleaning at a mix of buildings, some housing government-owned entities, some private. They both earn $14.10 per hour, less than the union's $18.40 living wage recommendation. He then points out the current version of Labor candidate pledges:

Grant Robertson pledged to set a timetable to pay the living wage to all government workers and contractors.

David Cunliffe promised to "roll out a living wage as a minimum for public servants and, as we can afford it, through the contractor process".

But the third contender, Shane Jones, refused to commit to the policy, and Prime Minister John Key said it would cost $2.5 billion and destroy 26,000 jobs.

If Labour puts in a $18.40 minimum wage for government workers, the featured family would likely only be getting this for their shift cleaning at a school unless the school contracts out facilities maintenance. And the school might shift to contracting out to keep costs down unless the government topped up its budget to make up the difference. If contractors also have to pay it, then the featured family does better in the short to medium term. But recall that if the potential benefits are large, so too are the incentives to shift to renting serviced facilities and so to have cleaners and other maintenance staff out from under the living wage mandate. So either it doesn't do much, or it gets circumvented. Collins also notes in passing that Ofa, one member of his featured family, is a delegate for the Service and Food Workers Union. I expect that the unions as a whole do well out of the measure, if it's extended to contractors, because it blunts the force of contracted outsourcing in keeping costs (and wages) down.

Collins then works through some of the costing estimates on living wage mandates, correctly noting that increasing the minimum wage to $18.40 would be very expensive. He then quotes me on the likely disemployment effects of an $18.40 minimum applied only to the government sector:

Those taxpayers would have less to spend, but low-paid state workers would have more. Even right-wing blogger Eric Crampton, a Canterbury University economist, wrote this week that the net effect would be minor: "Lots of people queue for jobs in the high-paying sector, but they'll take lower-paying jobs in the private sector."

I do expect that there wouldn't be much change in aggregate employment with a living wage mandate applied only to government workers and contractors because I expect that the government has close to a vertical labour demand curve for such workers and tasks.* There would be job rationing - in other words, more people wanting to work as cleaners in the public sector than there are available jobs - and the unions could extract higher dues as consequence. But Councils and Government would be likely, in the short term at least, just to pay more and make it up with increased taxes. In the medium to longer term, I still would expect a shift to government departments taking up tenancies in serviced buildings, but where the cleaning budget is a small part of the overall calculus, the effects mightn't be large.

Collins nicely does cite the literature on that living wage mandates are very poorly targeted and that we could do rather better by increasing targeted benefits. Then he cites U Vic's Morris Altman:

Morris Altman, a renowned Canadian economist who moved to Wellington's Victoria University in 2009, argues that a living wage is "a moral imperative situated in the natural rights of individuals".

His research suggests that a wage rise can actually pay for itself by raising productivity through motivating workers to work harder and stay in their jobs, and by inducing employers to introduce new technology and train workers to work smarter.

But that is only true, he warns, if wages are raised at a rate that productivity can keep up with. "So one has to be ultra-careful about by how much one increases. If it's a radical increase, that might be too much to deal with in the short-term," he says. "You might need a bit of an adjustment period to get productivity up."

I choose to take it as a compliment that Collins seems to have assumed that I'm Kiwi.

I haven't read Morris's work on living wages. I'd disagree pretty strongly with him on moral imperatives and natural rights, but I'm pretty sure neither of us gets to trump the other on that kind of question. And I can believe that, in some cases, salary increases can be self-financing - that's the general basis underlying efficiency wage theories (which also typically generate equilibrium unemployment). But we expect that firms choosing to increase wages on this kind of basis do so because they expect the salary increase to be worth the cost. I'm a bit curious why we'd expect those results to hold where employers are forced to pay more, but I'll perhaps have to look up his book this summer.


* I do hesitate a bit here though. I remember when the University set up a sustainability framing for a change in how they handled departmental waste collection. Instead of cleaning staff going into each office every night and emptying the bin, academic staff were asked to bring their trash and recycling bins to a central waste bin on each floor and those central bins would be collected every night. Maybe you could make some kind of sustainability case for it where staff who hate the cost of shuffling off doing a trash run every night might instead produce less waste. I'm not sure I believe it. But I am pretty sure they were able to cut the costs of building cleaning because of the policy change. At a minute per room for unlocking, collection, and relocking... well, it adds up. So there's often a margin, even where we don't expect there to be one.

Cupcake Freedom

Campbell Live tonight reported on Auckland Council's shutting down of some kids' cupcake stands at a local mall. Because the mall ran the kids' day once a month, according to the story, it then counted as a commercial market. And so the kids had to produce their food in a commercial kitchen.

I initially thought that the new Food Bill was to blame. It was introduced back in 2010 and got a fair bit of push-back in early 2012. But that cannot be the case. Submissions on the Bill closed only a month ago. Since I had never heard of Councils in NZ hitting kid bake stands like this, and as Auckland was blaming national regulations, I incorrectly assumed that the Food Bill had to have gone through. And so I apologise for blaming the Food Bill and its sponsor, Kate Wilkinson.

I still would very much like to know whether there is basis in existing national regulations for Auckland's rather heavyhanded actions in this case. Either the regulation has existed and hasn't been enforced elsewhere, the regulations have changed, or Auckland's interpretation is incorrect.

The original post follows below. It is based on an incorrect premise. I have run a strikethrough tag through it so that it's obvious that it ought not be relied upon.

Update: And I thank @mellopuffy for the correction.
Update 2: More detail here.

Kate Wilkinson promised us this wouldn't happen. And yet here we are.

Her op-ed of January 2012 sought to put to rest petitioner fears that the Food Safety Bill would shut down a lot of small scale entrepreneurship. She wrote:

Those behind the online petition opposing the bill claim it will seriously impede initiatives like community gardens, food co-ops, heritage seed banks, farmers' markets and roadside fruit and vegetable stalls. This is nonsense.

At most, people involved in such activity, where it presents a low risk, will be provided with information.

Events such as sausage sizzles, home bake sales, and other fundraising events will still occur as they always have.The bill is intended to protect, not harm such events, as the bill's critics would have us believe.

Bartering of food is currently included in the Food Act 1981. The proposed bill simply clarifies that those bartering with food, as part of a food business, must ensure it is safe and suitable.

Many small-scale bartering activities will only be subject to food handler guidance – for example, those bartering home-grown produce for goods and services. However, larger scale bartering of food exists and it is appropriate that those enterprises are subjected to the same risk-based measures as those selling their food products in a more conventional manner.

I wrote:

So is the new regime worth the cost? That depends on the compliance costs that will be faced by small and mid-sized traders. Wilkinson assures us that small traders won't face onerous burdens, but I'd really prefer seeing proper analysis of the Bill from someone like Otago's Andrew Geddis. And we have to keep in mind that a substantial proportion of the costs Wilkinson cites might actually be voluntary choices consumers are making that, on lucky draws, yield tasty goodness any diminution of which consequent to regulation ought be counted against the Bill's possible health benefits. Banning me and others like me from having my hamburgers medium-rare might save the health system a bit, but it'll certainly cost me some utils. Equally bad is what a big fixed-cost regime would do to food startups. I really hope that the legislation isn't as costly on those two fronts as some folks fear; I'd love to see independent legal analysis.

So: I was worried about compliance costs on small traders; Wilkinson promised there was nothing to worry about.

Tonight's Campbell Live has Auckland Council shutting down a mall's efforts to support young entrepreneurs. Once a month, they let the kiddies set up little stands selling their cupcakes. Council says that they're forced to shut it down because of Kate Wilkinson's Food Safety Bill. Hit the link to watch the video.

Kate, if you were serious about what you wrote in 2012, you will fix this, right? If your op-ed was right, Auckland shouldn't be interpreting your legislation this way. Please tell them, and tell every other Council, that they are not required to do what Auckland is doing. The problem is Auckland's interpretation, right? Because when I tweet stories from the States about Council health people knocking over kids' lemonade stands, I usually append an #emigrate tag.

Surely here in New Zealand we're not going to need a cupcake equivalent of this?

Standards shopping

Small jurisdictions have a hard time covering all the bases. Developing regulations is expensive. If you're determined to have "My Jurisdiction" versions of each and every regulation that could be out there, you're either going to have a ridiculously expensive regulatory regime or you're going to stymie development in niche markets.

Yesterday I pointed to the problems facing Manitoba's Harborside Farms. They want to develop traditional Italian cured meats in small artisanal batches for sale in Manitoba. But they're forbidden from doing it because, unless you can prove your product meets Manitoba regulations, you can't sell it. And it's a sufficiently small market that Manitoba never got around to writing any regulations that would allow them to operate.

Leaving aside for now the very sensible alternative of simply allowing standard consumer protection legislation and liability solve this kind of issue, there's an obvious alternative. Let them produce their product under the Italian regulations, then have Manitoba inspectors verify that they've met the Italian standard.

The problem is very similar to one facing importers of niche-market DVDs in New Zealand. How? You can't sell DVDs here unless you get them rated by the Censor's Office. And they don't rate DVDs for free. If you make a buck a piece on the sale, you'd still need to ship a thousand units in a country of four million people (and change) to cover just the ratings cost.

The solution there is the same as that which should obtain for Harborside. Allow import of films that have been rated by the Australians, or the Canadians, or the Brits, or the Americans, or some other set of trusted countries, and simply require that the ratings sticker note the country which issued the rating.

This kind of solution can be applied across rather a few thin-market small-jurisdiction scenarios. Why does every small area have to reinvent every wheel?

Take it a step further. If Manitobans can import Italian-made products meeting Italian standards, why shouldn't they be able to produce things in Manitoba to Italian specifications, even if a Manitoba regulation does exist? Simply require that the product be labelled as meeting Italy's standards.

Maybe it wouldn't work for everything. A building that meets Canadian building standards instead of New Zealand standards would be better than a New Zealand standard building, unless there's an earthquake. But again, it isn't hard to imagine strange niche construction areas where there might not be domestic specifications, but where the Japanese standards would work a treat.

The fixed costs of developing regulations aren't trivial. Why not allow a bit of forum shopping to spread the burden?

Food Fight

Oh, Manitoba. Just when you start looking sane, you go back to your old wacky ways.

Recall that Manitoba is the province where you can't sell a potato without, well, hassles.*

Now, read this one and weep. Since I was a kid in Manitoba, the government made much fuss about agricultural diversification, wanting farmers to move to more processing and oddball thin-market crops.

The Cavers at Harborside Farms are a great example of how this can be done well. They raise Berkshire hogs outside of Pilot Mound, a small town a couple hours southwest of Winnipeg. They started curing hams following old Italian recipes. Bartley Kives reports:

In May, Manitoba Agriculture Food and Rural Initiatives awarded a $10,000 prize to Harborside Farms, after inviting owner Pamela and Clinton Cavers to compete in a contest called the Great Manitoba Food Fight in Brandon.

The cash prize for the Cavers' pastured-pork prosciutto was intended to help the couple further commercialize the cured meats they had been producing on their farm since 2008, using traditional Italian recipes.

In June, inspectors from a different branch of MAFRI ordered Harborside to stop selling all of its cured meats, known in culinary terms as charcuterie, which had appeared on the tables of higher-end Winnipeg restaurants such as Pizzeria Gusto and Bistro 71/4.

The Cavers, who also hoped to sell their product at De Luca's Specialty Foods, claim they complied with the order.

But on Wednesday, as University of Manitoba environment students were about to tour the Harborside grounds, a pair of inspectors drove up and seized the couple's entire inventory of charcuterie -- about 160 kilograms of the cured pork and beef products known as prosciutto, lonzino, capicollo, bresaola, salumi and soppressata.

The Cavers said they were each handed $600 fines.

"The fine was for selling food unfit for human consumption. This was the same food the agriculture minister ate in May," said Pamela Cavers, referring to MAFRI Minister Ron Kostyshyn, who tasted Harborside's prize-winning prosciutto at the contest in May.

So, was anything wrong with their cured meats? No. Absolutely nothing. But they didn't follow the approved process. Why? Because there wasn't one. They were following traditional processes, the food was safe, and they'd asked the government for advice on making sure they were also compliant with any process specs that the government might wish to impose.

The provincial inspectors took no issue with any aspect of the farm aside from the charcuterie operation, whose entire processes they deemed unsatisfactory, Pamela Cavers said. A June inspection yielded an order to build a separate drying room and acquire instruments to monitor pH levels and moisture, among other issues, she said.

The Cavers said they had been attempting to obtain specific guidelines for producing artisanal charcuterie, but could not receive direction from the provincial food development centre in Portage la Prairie.

"They said they had no idea what to compare it to," she said, adding officials had no experience with charcuterie. She said a call to the minister's office during the Wednesday raid yielded advice to call the chief veterinary officer. "They didn't even know what charcuterie was," she said.

Were the Cavers selling unfit food? No. An informed correspondent tells me that Manitoba Health has no adopted procedures as yet for dry cured meats. The Cavers tried proving that their product was safe, by various bacteria, moisture, and pH tests at the Portage Food Lab. But there's no standard that the government could point to showing whether it was good enough.

Because Manitoba Agriculture, Food and Rural Initiatives (MAFRI) does not have Manitoba Health standards against which they can judge things, they just took all of the Cavers' stuff. Even if the Cavers perfectly followed all of the Italian standards, they're still in violation of Manitoba law. Because they're not following Manitoba standards. Because nobody has written any Manitoba standards.

A rational province would, where no official provincial standard exists, simply adopt an existing proven standard from an outside trusted source and verify that a Manitoba producer's practices meet that standard. Alternatively, perhaps somebody in Manitoba should start trying to get approval to sell chocolate-coated cotton.

There's a petition up here wishing that the Manitoba government be sensible. I hope it's successful.

* See:

• Canadian agriculture is completely screwed up
• Manitoba potato monopoly
• More Manitoba potatoes
• Manitoba potato monopoly...update
• Manitoba potatoes - again!
• Ceasefire in the spud wars

Broken Windows, Part II: Will a Disaster Rebuild Increase Capacity Utilisation?

Following on from yesterday’s post on the broken-windows fallacy, Miguel’s second point is that the broken windows fallacy rests on an assumption of full utilisation of resources (so that resources devoted to repairing damage from a natural disaster have an opportunity cost somewhere else). He notes:

We're clearly not in full employment now, and we weren't before the quakes, so what basis do we have for claiming that "all the resources now devoted to cleaning up and rebuilding would have been employed elsewhere"? My point is that economists are too content to simply make this assertion without actually demonstrating it.

I will concede that it will be extremely difficult to provide evidence, but that is not a cop out. Note that market economies are very good at utilising their resources. We tend to look at unemployment and see the cup as being 5%-10% empty, but it is also 90%-95% full. Employment is less than 1/6^th the size in New Zealand as it is in Australia, but that has nothing to do with the tendency for natural disasters there compared to here. They have more population and so the market economy creates more jobs. We understand pretty well how coordination through price signals achieves this matching of jobs to available workers. What we don’t understand well is why capacity utilisation consistently falls short of 100% and why the utilisation rates fluctuate. We have plenty of plausible stories involving frictions, asymmetric information, expectations, monopoly power, sticky prices, etc. but it is likely that the relative importance of these factors is very dependent on time and place.

So yes, we know that we employment was not at 100% before or since the earthquakes, and that following the GFC, unemployment rates have been higher than before; but we don’t know exactly what determines those rates. We also know that the Reserve Bank monitors economic activity and adjusts policy to try to keep activity at the level consistent with stable inflation; we further know that New Zealand is not close to being in a low-interest-rate liquidity trap, the story often advanced for why monetary policy might not be effective.

With this backdrop, we can’t be sure that the rebuild from a disaster wouldn't result in a greater utilisation rate of resources, but nor can we be sure that it wouldn't result in a lower rate. The best guess, however, would be that rebuilds would be unrelated to whatever it is that results in utilisation rates of less than 100%, and so would have no effect.

Broken Windows, Part I: Measured GDP Versus Welfare

Shamubeel posted here on Monday on whether natural disasters can be beneficial for an economy. In the comments, Miguel Sanchez and I discussed a bit whether economists are too quick to shout “broken windows fallacy” in such cases. There are a couple of interesting issues here, each of which is worth a separate post. 

Miguel points to this paper from the BIS (with a great title up to the colon, pity they felt obliged to add the post-colon clarification). The paper makes the claim that insured events, while not necessarily beneficial are “inconsequential in terms of foregone (sic) output”. A quick skim of the paper suggests that there are two separate aspects to this result. There can be a degree of over-insurance when a natural disaster destroys productive capital, since replacing that capital will typically result in newer and possibly more advanced capital. If the insurance liability falls outside of the region (for instance, as a result of reinsurance), then this improvement to the capital stock will have been financed from outside the region, and it is easy to see that this can generate a situation where a disaster leads to greater output (naturally, to be weighed against any direct human costs of the disaster). A fair amount of the insurance liability in New Zealand, however, fell inside New Zealand. In this case, the resulting improvement in the capital stock can still lead to an increase in the discounted flow of current and future GDP, but only because of a flaw in the way GDP is measured, and not because of any actual benefit.

To explain, consider how intermediate goods are treated in the measurement of GDP. If a household buys foodstuffs to make meals, the expenditure on that food is considered a final good and measured in GDP. If a restaurant buys those same ingredients, however, to prepare meals for customers, the sale of the meals is measured in GDP, but the expenditure on ingredients is not, as their value is already included in the price of the meal. To do otherwise would be double counting. Let’s imagine that, contrary to this normal practice, we were to change the definition of GDP and count both the food sold to restaurants and the meals sold to customers in GDP. In that world, if there was a preference shift and people chose to eat out more, we would see a big increase in measured GDP, but not one that reflected a comparable increase in welfare. Even worse, imagine that the government, under pressure to improve the data on GDP growth were to pass a law requiring people to eat in restaurants rather than at home. Measured GDP would have grown, but welfare would have fallen as people were forced to spend their income in ways different from what they would like.

This is obviously silly, and we would never make such a change to the way GDP is measured. It is, however, exactly analogous to the way we treat investment in GDP. Just as people can choose whether to spend their income on ingredients or eating out, based on relative costs and their own preferences, people can choose whether to consume to today, or save and consume in the future, with the interest they earn from their saving derived in large part from the return that can be obtained from the saving when used to invest. In other words, investment today is just an intermediate good that generates consumption in the future. By including investment in the measure of GDP today and then the flow of output from that investment in the measure of GDP in the future, we are double counting, just we would be if we counted both food sold to restaurants and the meals produced from it. And if a natural disaster leads to an increase in investment, funded not from outside, and not from a decrease in investment elsewhere, but from reduced consumption by those holding the insurance liability, then the flow of measured GDP will rise, but only because of the increased double counting not because of any increase in welfare, just as in the fanciful case where the government required eating out. As best I can see, the result presented by the authors of the BIS paper  rests on this double counting convention. 

I will follow up on Miguel's second point tomorrow. 

Reader mailbag: Dunedin plastic mountains edition

In the inbox, from our Professor of Finance:

Oh the irony - the 'sustainability' of recycling

Ratepayers are going to be charged more to keep producing a 'good' that nobody apparently wants or needs! Now that's certainly a 'sustainable' policy…

The ODT article forwarded me by the good Professor Glenn Boyle notes:

As a stockpile of the city's plastic waste grows ever bigger, the Dunedin City Council is being warned it may have to increase rates if returns from recycling do not improve.

The amount Dunedin people recycle has increased by a third since a new service was introduced in 2011.

That increase, combined with the high New Zealand dollar and a four-month stay on sending some plastics to the main Chinese market following a crackdown on contaminants in recyclables that has put traders off selling to China, resulted in the council running the service at a loss last year.

...The situation has prompted council solid waste manager Ian Featherston to warn the council this week that although the exchange rate was falling and new markets for the materials were being sought, the reduced target of a $210,000 return this financial year might also be difficult to achieve.

In that case, the kerbside recycling targeted rate would need to be increased next year from $64 to $69, he said.

Mr Featherston said Dunedin people recycle about 30 tonnes of material a month.

The stockpile of plastics being held had now reached about 150 tonnes.

Recycling programmes can still make sense even if they run at a loss, but only if the costs of disposing of this kind of plastic via the recycling system is lower than the costs of disposing of it via landfill. If it costs $30/tonne to get rid of waste at the landfill and the net costs of a recycling programme are $20/tonne, we're still $10/tonne better off by having it.

When I'd run some ballpark numbers on Christchurch's system in 2009, it looked like we were paying at least twice as much to get rid of waste via recycling, on average, as we were paying for disposal at Kate Valley. Some recyclables are of high value and are worth sending through a recycling system, but most of it is not worth the cost.

The numbers in Christchurch have likely changed with our newer bin system that separates out composting waste; the Otago numbers too could vary. I'd be surprised if it made sense to be stockpiling plastics in hopes of shipping them to China, but it's not impossible.

Tiki tours and useful idiots

Back during the Cold War, Western intellectuals were given guided tours of the Soviet Block and sent home to heap praise on the wonders achieved by Stalin. They were collectively called "useful idiots": too dumb to see through the Potemkin villages raised, but useful for internal and external state propaganda.

Last week, Liberty Scott started posting and tweeting on Gareth Morgan's motorcycle tour of North and South Korea. He pointed to numerous instances of Morgan's appearance being used in North Korean state media helping to legitimise the regime.

When I visited the DMZ on a USO tour back in 2007, we were given really strict instructions by the American military. Do not smile at the other side. Do not point. Do not do anything that the North Korean agents on the other side could photograph and print in their newspapers as "Westerner points to the Glorious North, admiring the wonders of Juche." I'm not generally all that keen on "do as I say" regs, but these ones made a lot of sense. One of the world's most evil regimes was staring back - literally, guys with binoculars and big-lens cameras - and I was publicity-shy.

But maybe playing the regime-supporting shill while there was needed so that he could have some chance at seeing what was going on.

Matt Nolan at TVHE yesterday pointed to Gareth Morgan's comments on his tour. Morgan wrote:

Having passed successfully through the demilitarised zone Gareth explains to the world’s media why the West’s “beat-up” view of North Korea is completely wrong.

Gareth and Jo and their group were free to set their own route through North Korea, witnessing at first hand the lives of ordinary North Koreans.

What they found surprised them – a people who were poor, yes, but wonderfully engaged, well-dressed, fully employed and well informed. In Gareth’s view, what North Korea has achieved economically despite its lack of access to international money has been magnificent.

He and Jo support active steps towards providing greater opportunities for ordinary Koreans from North and South to interact together – a goal of leaders from both North and South Korea. Hopefully, with enormous interest from the world media, this trip will be the catalyst for such a change.

Unbelievable. I'd thought that he was going to come out claiming that starvation works wonders on reducing feral cat numbers; this is worse.

Maybe there was some case for the tour somehow facilitating better North-South talks. Unlikely, but not impossible. But that the West has a "beat-up" view of North Korea? They have freaking concentration camps! Morgan's next tour could perhaps hit a few of those off-piste highlights. Morgan found the North Koreans with whom he spoke wonderfully well-informed; it's problematic even asking what that means in a place where preference-falsification is a necessary survival characteristic. As Xavier Marquez wrote:

There is a terrific story in Barbara Demick’s Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (pp. 97-101), which illustrates both how such control mechanisms can work regardless of belief and the degradation they inflict on people. The story is about a relatively privileged student, “Jun-sang,” at the time of the death of Kim Il-sung (North Korea’s “eternal president”). The death is announced, and Jun-sang finds that he cannot cry; he feels nothing for Kim Il-Sung. Yet, surrounded by his sobbing classmates, he suddenly realizes that “his entire future depended on his ability to cry: not just his career and his membership in the Workers’ Party, his very survival was at stake. It was a matter of life and death” (p. 98). So he forces himself to cry. And it gets worse: “What had started as a spontaneous outpouring of grief became a patriotic obligation … The inmiban [a neighbourhood committee] kept track of how often people went to the statue to show their respect. Everybody was being watched. They not only scrutinized actions, but facial expressions and tone of voice, gauging them for sincerity” (p. 101). The point of the story is not that nobody experienced any genuine grief at the death of Kim Il-sung (we cannot tell if Jun-sang’s feelings were common, or unusual) but that the expression of genuine grief was beside the point; all must give credible signals of grief or be considered suspect, and differences in these signals could be used to gauge the level of support (especially important at a time of leadership transition; Kim Il-sung had just died, and other people could have tried to take advantage of the opportunity if they had perceived any signals of wavering support from the population; note then the mobilization of the inmiban to monitor these signals). Moreover, the cult of personality induces a large degree of self-monitoring; there is no need to expend too many resources if others can be counted to note insufficiently credible signals of support and bring them to the attention of the authorities.

Even if Morgan was away from his handlers, everyone is a handler. That's the point of a totalitarian regime. Any disclosure can get you and your family sent to a concentration camp because somebody else will have purchased an indulgence by dobbing you in. And the safest course is making yourself believe the things you have to say.

Compare Gareth Morgan's visit with a couple other recent Western visits. Here's Neil Woodburn's travelogue. Here's what Curtis Melvin did while visiting North Korea, and subsequently. Melvin's mapping project would let Gareth Morgan check to see which prison camps he missed along his tour. Liberty Scott's update has some useful recommended readings as well.

Living wage mandates revisited

Two candidates for the Labour Party leadership have promised that they will require the payment of "living wages" for all government employees and for all government contractors. Matthew Hooton asked about the likely effects.

Were the government promising an $18.40 minimum wage across the board, things would be rather worse. The median hourly wage in the 2012 NZ Income Survey was $20.86. A minimum wage that's 88% of the median wage would be rather, well, breathtaking. Recall the median wage is the one where half of all wage earners earn more and half earn less. Workers vary in ability; a minimum wage at 88% of the median would disemploy anyone who cannot produce value equal to just a bit less than the median worker. This would obviously be very bad. Recall that unemployment weighs far more heavily in disutility than do wages. Chris Dillow made the case a few months ago. Those who want to improve the lot of the working poor do far better by pushing for wage subsidy schemes like Working For Families [New Zealand's EITC] than by making it too expensive to hire lower productivity workers.

The proposal here isn't for an $18.40 minimum wage but rather for a living wage mandate for government workers. The effects then are more minor. Imagine that we have rent control on a bunch of apartments but no rent control on new buildings. We'd then expect excess demand for the rent-controlled flats, but a clearing market elsewhere. Similarly, a living wage mandate in the government sector shouldn't have huge equilibrium unemployment effects. Lots of people queue for jobs in the high-paying sector, but they take lower-paying jobs in the private sector.

The main effect will be an increase in the cost of providing some government services. At the margin, this should mean that we have a few fewer things done by government, albeit within the context of an expansion in the size of government under a future Labour government. There would also then need to be an increase in taxes to fund it, or reduced spending in other areas to compensate, or higher deficits. I suspect Labour would bridge the gap via tax.

There will be some transitional unemployment as marginal jobs undertaken by government get shifted away from the government sector. If some of these workers were earning substantial rents in the government sector and are not employable above the legal minimum wage in the private sector, there could be some increased longer-term unemployment from that. But that shouldn't be any substantial part of the market. There will also be rather a few transitional costs where bureaus start renting fully serviced buildings with gardening and cleaning provided as part of the rent rather than either hiring those kinds of workers directly or through a contractor.

Another important effect: contractors will enjoy less of a cost advantage relative to government departments; we could easily read the policy as a way of trying to knock out contracted services to benefit public sector unions. See my discussion on the same issue when some city councils were talking about similar ideas. Some of my discussion of the likely effects of maximum wage gap mandates in government also apply.

Note as well that government sector workers are already overpaid relative to their private sector counterparts. While this may worsen the imbalance, it means that fewer government workers would be caught in the interval from the minimum to the proposed "living" wage than would be the case among private sector employees. The costs of a living wage mandate may be lower where imposed on the government sector than where imposed broadly. Imagine it in the limit: a $500/hour minimum wage in government. I expect that while government workers would earn a lot more, government would be a much smaller share of the economy. And think of the productivity gains in government: we'd only be choosing to use government rather than markets where we expected the social value of some government function were exceptionally high indeed.  

So while I wouldn't expect large disemployment effects from the policy, it's hardly a great idea. If you want to increase the wages of the working poor, you hardly should be starting with government workers, who earn more on average than those in the private sector and who typically also enjoy greater job security and flexibility. And if you want to run transfers to the working poor, generalised wage subsidies are the least distortionary way of doing it. Labour's proposed mechanism would be likely to reduce the efficiency of government services by pushing away from contracting out, and to skew the optimal balance between government services and other goods and services by increasing public sector costs.

Update: John Key also is no fan of Labour's proposal. He suggests additional costs where aggregate wages are bid up, or at least that's my interpretation of his argument that companies wind up having to pay more and that consumer costs then go up. That's possible within particular labour markets but I have a hard time seeing big aggregate effects.

Let's think of the market for service workers in restaurants. Suppose that the lowest-skilled workers work the cashier's station at the cafeteria in some government office. And let's suppose that this cafeteria continues to exist rather than the venue being leased out to a private sector firm, which it would under a $18.40 living wage mandate. The highest-skilled workers work at the fancy high-end restaurants, or work more complex jobs requiring a lot of balancing of tasks.

The living wage mandate then comes in. Currently employed cafeteria workers then are earning huge rents. Suppose we then have a lot of job applications from higher-skilled restaurant workers and, as consequence, job redefinitions to make better use of the more highly skilled staff. We then have more competition for more highly skilled restaurant staff and could see some bidding up of wages within that market. But there would still be low-skilled cafeterias in the private sector. With migration into that sector from former public sector workers who had been displaced, we could see some bidding down of wages in that part of the market. I can see mechanisms where there's bidding up of private sector wages in some markets, but I'd also expect potential bidding down where lower-tier government workers move back into the private sector. 

In defence of simplistic models

This post on methodology is related to recent discussions about the role of maths in economics (Matt has a good summary with the relevant links here), but is actually response to a comment by Chris B over at SciBlogs to my initialpost on Labour’s proposed ban on non-resident ownership of houses. (Yes, this post is long overdue. Events have conspired to keep me away from blogging for a couple of weeks.) 

Chris says: 

You know, the more I think on it, the more dissatisfied I am with this thought exercise. If only because Seamus has seen fit to call it a “very simple model of the New Zealand housing market”. It realy isn’t . It’s simply a fictional market with certain highly abstract asserted properties. No more realistic or useful than the various maths exercises from my own university level economics classes.

Fair enough. I should have said a simple model to help think about the New Zealand housing market. The point of this post is to ask whether simplistic models can be useful. Note that such models are unrealistic by design. If I were writing an academic paper, I would have used a much more complicated model, and if writing a problem set for an undergraduate class, something only a bit more complicated. But this was a blog post, so the model was designed to be easily solveable in your head. (I hope that the maths exercises from Chris’ university-level economics classes were more involved than this one; if not he was severely short-changed by his university.)

In general, a simplistic model is designed to make one or two points by stripping away every piece of reality except a specific thing that you want to highlight. Some of the assumptions one makes in doing this are simply removing irrelevant reality in order to focus attention on the key aspect of the question at hand. Others are more like dogs that don’t bark in the night; seeing what happens when you assume away some aspect of reality highlights how important that aspect is. Chris lists a whole bunch of assumptions in my model. I won’t go into these in detail, but I would argue that they all fit into one of these two categories. Some, like the assumptions about homogeneous preferences and housing quality are just assuming away irrelevant reality. Others, like the assumption of inelastic supply are non-barking-dog assumptions. As I noted in my original post, when you relax this assumption, you make the case against bans on foreign ownership stronger. 

The realism or lack thereof of a model is therefore not a criterion for judging a model’s success. A simplistic model can be criticised for one of three reasons: 

a) the intuitive point that is laid bare when all other reality is stripped away is so obvious that the point doesn’t need to be made;

b) the model doesn’t actually illustrate the point being made; or

c) the point is actually wrong, and the model fails because it stripped away some highly relevant aspect of reality.

The third is not necessarily a criticism. If a model’s intuition can be changed by adding in some relevant piece of reality, the process of starting with a simple model and then relaxing the assumptions lays bare what the crucial step is for generating a particular conclusion and informs where one needs to look for empirical evidence supporting it.

Now, in my post, I was looking to make two points: The first was that the price of houses depends on the current and future expected stock of houses and the current and future expected demand for housing (i.e. the willingness of people to pay to live in houses); changing the rules on who is allowed to be non-occupier owners of houses should not change the price of housing absent a mechanism for the policy to affect demand for occupancy or the stock. The second point was that if speculation is pushing up the price of houses, it is only because house prices are expected to increase in the future; attempts to restrict speculation without dealing with the underlying drivers only delay the issue.

Now I don’t think you can say that my model fails on the ground of being too obvious, as so much public commentary on housing policy simply routinely ignores these two points. Whether the model is successful in illustrating the point is very much in the eye of the beholder. For the third criticism, I certainly can imagine relaxing assumptions to generate different conclusions and inform a debate about what is the more likely state of the world. Chris, however, would prefer to eschew the simplistic model altogether. In his words:

Plainly the exercise does not remotely resemble the New Zealand Housing market. Why, then, should we have any particular faith in our ability to extrapolate from the though exercise to what will happen in the real-world economy.

In what sense does the model not resemble the New Zealand housing market? The model has both renters and owner occupiers. It has owners of rental properties who earn investment income from the ownership. It has a future expected increase in the demand for housing, and in that world has landlords earning a below-market rate of return. All describe exactly, say, the Auckland housing market. Yes, the real-world economy has other things as well, but it is important to understand the simple models before adding complications. What is the alternative?  Chris’ conclusion is as follows:

Perhaps a better approach to arguing against the policy on economic grounds would be to identify other places where it has been implemented and talk about the impacts which have resulted. Potentially tricky to isolate the impacts of the policy from other confounding factors, but if it can be done, there’s the advantage of being able to present some empirical evidence against it. 

 Alternatively, perhaps we might drop the thought exercise entirely as extraneous and talk specifically about how we expect foreign buyers will react to future restrictions on their activities, consequences for investment decisions and the like.

Not so fast. How do social scientists isolate impacts from confounding factors? They use theory. That is, they have a model or competing models in mind that would be consistent with some observed correlations but not with others. And how can you learn anything about how foreign buyers will react to restrictions on their activities and what impact that reaction will have for the housing market, if you don’t have a view about how their behaviour relates to conditions in the housing market, how other people will respond to that reaction, etc.? 

In other words, careful empirical and behavioural analysis rests on models, and complicated models rest on simplistic ones. Non-careful analysis, in contrast, rests on unstated models, models that are potentially self-contradictory or rest on assumptions that have assumed away relevant reality but have never been made explicit. 

Parking Market Failures

Does any market failure argument justify parking minima? Many cities require that residential developments include some minimum number of off-street carparks. Can these be justified?

Well, I'm glad you asked, Agnito.

The best argument I've heard for these regulations is that on-street parking is rivalrous and non-excludable. If you have an apartment building with too few carparks, residents will park on the street or might keep flitting between a few different no-parking zones, staying one step ahead of the enforcement officers. A lot of people see paying for parking a bit like hiring other kinds of personal services: why pay for it when you can apply yourself and perhaps get it for free? And if you find the perfect parking spot, there's then a huge opportunity cost of leaving the space: people with really good parking spaces never give them up. Finding the perfect space can be a joy to be shared with others. Further, where excess congestion from everyone's free-riding on on-street parking gives incentive for the able-bodied to park in handicapped spaces (or in front of fire hydrants), disastrous consequences can ensue.

Having mandatory parking minima then avoids the free-riding on the on-street parking that could best be left for higher-turnover use. And where long-term on-street parking is discouraged only by time limits, it also encourages other socially wasteful forms of entrepreneurship.

The best response to this kind of argument is that it's massively second-best relative to the more efficient solution: price on-street parking. Do that properly and everything else sorts itself out.

Of course, in that world, Seinfeld wouldn't have been nearly as good. And where Gerry Brownlee wants to ban Auckland from using congestion charging, we might not be able to get first-best parking charges anyway.

For the record though: there is no real-world market failure sufficiently large to justify mandatory parking minimums. At least not in Auckland, best I can tell.