Monday, July 9, 2012

Worthless rugby players

If a rugby player leaves for Japan, is there a loss to the country? Seamus says no. So long as he's being paid his marginal product.
While rugby fans may decry his loss to the sport, Canterbury University economics lecturer Dr Seamus Hogan told NBR ONLINE there is no loss to the New Zealand economy.

"If he was prepared to play in New Zealand free, obviously that would be of tremendous value to the rugby union because it would get more bums on seats.

"Beyond that, there wouldn't be any spill over benefit economically to the country."

Dr Hogan says that in terms of economic activity, if Williams' presence in a match gets more fans into the stadium those people are just spending money they would have spent elsewhere.

"It is just a transfer. It's not a benefit to the country economically."

Dr Hogan says Williams gets almost the full value of his contract because he has unique talents.
If the Rugby Union is good at getting fans to pay for the value provided, and if Sonny Bill's manager is good at negotiating his pay, then he doesn't provide much value above his pay. Because the rugby union can't perfectly price discriminate, fans might get some surplus from a good player that isn't captured by the rugby union. But, if the player has a good manager, sponsorship and endorsement deals ought to mop up at least some of what's left.

But I would have expected that fans shifting away from rugby into something else because of the departure would have some loss of associated surplus. The other activity also generates surplus, just less of it; that's why it was the second choice prior to the staffing change.
He says somebody who is a very good lock, such as Brodie Retallick from the Chiefs, cannot command a high price because the next-best lock is right behind him.

"If he goes, the cost to the rugby union of losing him is not great because there is somebody waiting to take his place.

"But if Williams goes this year, we have to take a step down in the quality of our second five-eighths."

However, Dr Hogan says it would not be a big slide because there are plenty of other talented second five-eighths around.

Williams' biggest value is probably in terms of the entertainment he provides, such as taking his ripped shirt off during a World Cup match last year, he says.
 Afraid I'd missed that.

Sunday, July 8, 2012

No slippery slopes, nothing to see here

Never a slippery slope to be found.
The Health Select Committee, which is to hold an inquiry into the UK Government’s recently published alcohol strategy, will look into a series of proposals including plain packaging for alcohol sold in shops, similar to a plan being considered for cigarette packets. Yesterday MPs were warned that removing well-known trademark images such as Johnnie Walker’s striding man and the Famous Grouse on bottles, could damage the Scotch whisky industry, which is worth £4 billion in exports alone. Labelling of alcoholic products is currently reserved to the UK Government, which means that if Westminster eventually agreed a ban it would affect shops and products across the whole of the UK, including Scotland. It would hit all parts of the alcohol industry, but whisky producers believe it would be particularly damaging for them.
Chris Snowdon helpfully points to assurances that they're not planning plain packaging for food.

As I'd said a couple years ago, in a different context:
I always find it depressing how folks like NORML think beating up on alcohol makes marijuana legalization more likely rather than just making for tighter regs. The hospitality industry lobbies for more restrictions on supermarket-bought alcohol to boost sales in bars; small brewers push for more punitive tax rates on big brewers... the only winners are the healthists who get support bit by bit for more regulations on everything. It's like a bunch of folks on the scaffolds complaining that the other guy's noose isn't quite tight enough. Y'all might instead direct your attention to the hangman sometime and try helping each other cut those ropes.

Gouging!

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has really outdone itself with its new series, The Invisible Hand. Episode One takes on price gouging, featuring Mike Munger. As Stephen Gordon is economic advisor for the series, expect more good things to come.

I've had no end of problems in getting the podcasts to stream; Munger's figure out a link that works. Here.

I just about never listen to podcasts; with two under-4s, I don't get the alone-time where it works. But this one was worth making time for.

Previously on price gouging:

Thursday, July 5, 2012

Markets hate profits

Unless there's some barrier in the system preventing it, no firm can sit on excess profits forever. Competition erodes away the excess profit until everybody's again earning a normal rate of return. Today's case in point: alcohol minimum pricing. I've made the point before, but it's worth walking through again as the logic isn't immediately obvious to non-economists.

Neil Miller argues:
Because most craft beers are currently priced over the $2 a drink threshold, it could be argued that they will become closer in price to mainstream beers which might encourage drinkers to “trade up”.  However, the costs to the big breweries will not have increased and they will basically be making more money for the same beers.  This means they will be able to increase marketing and distribution efforts.  Mr Albertson’s point about minimum pricing putting pressure all the way up the chain is critical.  
He's right that the big brewers will have more money for marketing and distribution. But they're pretty unlikely to be making more money for the same beers. Let's walk through the logic.

Suppose I'm one of the big brewers and Labour takes power. Lianne Dalziel announces a $2 per standard drink minimum price. Doug Sellman shouts about how it should be $10. My product previously retailed at $1 and cost me $0.25 to produce. I got $0.05 in profit and the rest was distribution / retailing costs. Can I suddenly start pocketing $1.05 in profits for that drink?

Minimum pricing hasn't made my competitors go away. I expect that they'll be trying to increase market share. What should I do? The first thing I'd try is a new promotion: Every 4th case (24 pack) of beer has $20 inside. My production cost goes up by a bit over $0.20 per bottle, so I'm only pocketing $0.85 in profit per bottle. But if my market share goes up by enough, it's totally worth it.

My competitors try it too. They promise $20 in every 3rd case. Then somebody in Parliament figures out that the real cost of alcohol to consumers is nowhere near $2 per standard drink as we're effectively rebating a big pile of the minimum price to consumers as a cash lottery. So that gets banned.

What next? Free t-shirt! Free shot glasses! Free beer mugs (collect all 8!). Then Parliament bans bundling any kind of good with the beer.

What next? It depends a lot on how different cohorts of drinkers respond to increased product quality versus increased related amenities. Maybe I can turn my bottles into something that's beautiful, with a stopper cap on a wire that makes it useful for re-use as a water bottle. Maybe I can make my labelling nicer. Maybe I can open up my own bottle shops where I sell only my own product but there's just an awesome environment for my customers: free massage from a Tui Girl with every purchase.

Think I'm kidding? Look at what happened in the US when airline prices were regulated. The airlines were banned from competing on prices. So what did they compete on instead? Better meals, better drinks, and more attractive stewardesses.

Unless there's some barrier to competition somewhere in the system, nobody gets to sit on free profits. These kinds of rents get eroded pretty quickly. Customers either wind up buying alcohol that actually costs $2 per standard drink (less normal profit) to produce, or that's bundled with amenities they find more valuable than improvements in the quality of the drink but that still cost $2 per standard drink (less normal profit) to provide.

Who might get to enjoy excess profits - rents - out of minimum pricing? My first pick are those who have bottle shop licences in poor neighbourhoods. They'll have local monopoly rents, especially when their customers have a harder time going across town for bargains. That will be capitalised into the price of the firm, and the next guy who buys the bottle shop will only then be earning normal profits, but there's likely a windfall gain to some small bottle shops.

Markets hate free profits: somebody's always rushing in to try to grab them. That competitive process runs until everybody's just earning a normal rate of return. I'd expect that the only conditions under which the big breweries get to keep selling current product at a $2 per standard drink minimum profit and just bank the profits are the conditions under which they could do it without a minimum price. Basically they need a strong cartel that prevents entry. Fortunately, we're nowhere near that kind of a world, at least in New Zealand.

I guess I'll need a bridging loan [updated]

I'm a bit lost for words about EQC's latest rule change.

The Earthquake Commission charges a levy on all home insurance policies in New Zealand and covers the first hundred thousand dollars in damage to properties in the event of an earthquake, landslip, or other such event. There were warnings ahead of the Christchurch earthquakes that EQC was not charging enough to cover its potential liabilities and that it certainly was not well placed to manage any kind of major event; nobody paid much attention.

So anybody with home insurance in Christchurch has to deal with EQC. There's no obvious way of contracting around EQC to have a private insurer take on the things EQC normally covers. Where damage to a house is less than EQC's capped limit, you have a choice. Either you can project manage the rebuild yourself and submit the bills to EQC for payment, subsequent to their approval of a plan of works and costing, or you can have Fletcher's serve as project manager; Fletcher's is the default. While you can ask that Fletcher's use your preferred contractor in your repairs, some contractors now refuse to deal with Fletcher's. Where you let Fletcher's choose the contractors, there seems to be pretty high variance in outcomes.

We own an old weatherboard house with lots of character features; we wanted a contractor that specialises in that kind of home. We have full replacement insurance coverage. When our preferred contractor told us that he would not take on any more Fletchers-managed projects, we decided to go for an opt-out and let that contractor handle project management.

Now, EQC has changed the rules. Instead of our submitting the plan of works and proposed costings to EQC, followed by having the contractors bill EQC for the approved work directly, EQC has decided that opt-out owners have to pay their contractors directly then submit the bills to EQC for reimbursement.

EQC has a very bad history for paying on time. And if they decide, unilaterally and arbitrarily, to change the rules again mid-process, the homeowner is then stuck with costs.

We're now likely to need a bridging loan from our bank so we can handle our repair costs. And we'll have to hope EQC doesn't shaft us. But EQC is likely to shaft us.

At least we're likely to be able to get that kind of a loan. Or I expect we'll be able to; I'll have to talk with the bank.

This system stinks.

Update: Somebody called "EQC" in the comments at the Press site writes:
EQC has a number of changes to the Opting Out process with the aim of streamlining the process for customers and making it easier for them to take control of their own repairs, if they choose to do so. The flipside of EQC’s more hands-off role in these repairs is that we need to be clear about the customer’s responsibilities once they take on the role of project manager. To reflect this, EQC has produced some new customer information which including misleading wording relating to “reimbursement”. The revised wording places an emphasis on customers having the responsibility to manage invoices and EQC payments to ensure their contractor is paid on time. This is a standard part of the project management role, and it’s important customers know what is involved before taking the step to opt out of the Canterbury Home Repair Programme. As project manager, a customer running their own repairs takes on the risk that if invoices are incomplete, late arriving with EQC, or if some other complication arises, they may be required to pay a contractor upfront and be reimbursed. EQC pays on the 20th of the month following recpeit of invoice. As for Steve Brooks' comments that people not opting out will add years to the repair timeframe, the Canterbury Home Repair Programme has so far completed 18,000 full scope repairs - cusomters project managing their own repairs have completed a few hundred. But then Mr Brooks makes money when he persuades people to opt out, so he would say that.
I can't find anything on the EQC site discussing any of this.

Odoriferous statements

Prime Minister John Key said he didn't think minimum pricing would do much to curb heavy harmful drinking. Jennie Connor is quoted in a press release excoriating Key:
Mr Key announced today that he doesn't believe that minimum pricing for alcohol will change the amount people drink.

"This is contrary to the scientific evidence base about alcohol pricing in general and minimum pricing in particular" said Prof Jennie Connor, medical spokeperson for Alcohol Action NZ.

"Mr Key states that what typically happens is people move down 'the quality curve' and still get access to alcohol. Where does this information come from? On the contrary, minimum pricing specifically targets the very cheapest alcohol options and is predicted to reduce average consumption by removing high-alcohol low-cost products from the market."

"A recent Canadian study has shown that a 10% increase in the minimum price of alcohol reduces its consumption by 16% relative to other drinks".

"And these latest data are consistent with the scientific literature which indicates that increasing the price of alcohol has a positive impact on reducing heavy drinking". [emphasis added]
When I saw the release [HT: ed.co.nz], something seemed awfully odd about the bolded quote. What's the reference category, fruit juice? What's meant by "relative to other drinks"? So I dug around a bit for the work she's citing.

Connor is almost certainly referring to this Canadian study, which does argue in favour of minimum pricing. But compare their numbers with the bolded quote above.
The estimates indicate that a 10% increase in the minimum price of a given type of [alcoholic] beverage reduced consumption of that type by about 16.1% relative to all other  [alcoholic] beverages, and a simultaneous 10% increase in the minimum prices of all types reduced total consumption by 3.4% (p<0.01 in both cases). The first estimate may overestimate minimum price effects because it incorporates compensatory increases in consumption of all other beverages. The estimate of the effect of across-the-board changes in minimum prices on total consumption will be biased to the extent that the extra structure we imposed on the model is unrealistic.
Connor is citing the results from the own-price study as being the estimate of the effect of the across the board increase.

Doug Sellman, in the same press release, says
"The PM's statements reek of alcohol industry influence."
As for the bouquet emanating from the Connor/Sellman press release...

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Price elasticity of alcohol demand [Updated]

Otago's Jennie Connor cites some numbers on the elasticity of alcohol demand with respect to price that just seem off [HT: ed.co.nz].
But Professor of Preventive and Social Medicine at Otago University, Jennie Connor, says price does influence alcohol consumption.
She says studies show a 10 percent increase in the minimum price of alcohol reduces consumption 16 percent.
Professor Connor says it's a very efficient and effective way of reducing problems from alcohol, because it targets heavy drinkers the most.
I've been citing the Wagenaar meta-study results showing an aggregate alcohol demand elasticity of -0.44; she's saying it's -1.16 -1.6. There's a bit of a gap there.

When I look at Table 1 of Wagenaar's metastudy of 112 different studies of the price elasticity of demand, I can't find a single one that has an aggregate elasticity lower than -0.92 at the lower end of the confidence interval; the lowest point estimate is -0.84. Recall that you need to hit -1 to have a product that's price elastic. But those are aggregate estimates; maybe there's just something different about elasticity at the bottom end of the price distribution.

So let's have a look at a very recent Australian issues paper examining the case for minimum pricing. This one comes from the Australian National Preventative Health Agency. What do they say about demand elasticity at that end of the distribution?

First, we have to be awfully careful in distinguishing between own-price and aggregate category effects. If you look at the effects of a price increase in one category of product, you'll likely overestimate aggregate price responsiveness because price-sensitive shoppers will flip to another alcohol product category if one category's prices change.

Who does the Australian National Preventative Health Agency cite? Wagenaar, like I do: Wagenaar reports aggregate elasticity across all alcohol categories. They cite two other meta-studies, one of which, Gallet, also reports an aggregate category elasticity that's pretty much identical to Wagenaar's. Where Wagenaar gets -0.51, Gallet gets -0.52.* The last one only reports elasticity by category, which is next to useless for reckoning changes in response to minimum prices or cross-category excise increases, but within-category findings are about the same as Wagenaar and Gallet were getting in those kinds of estimates - more elastic than aggregate elasticity, but still nowhere near -1. Wagenaar gets -0.8 for spirits; people shift from spirits to other products more quickly when the price of spirits jumps.

Next, ANPHA cites some Sheffield figures on aggregate price elasticities for overall alcohol consumption: -0.47 for moderate drinkers and -0.21 for hazardous and harmful drinkers. They note too that, when we look at own-price elasticity within product categories, hazardous and harmful drinkers are more price elastic than moderate drinkers: they're more likely to shift product categories. But that tells us zilch about what harmful drinkers do in response to a price increase for the entire product category; it would be misleading to use this kind of data to claim that harmful drinkers are the most price responsive. They're most price responsive when their preferred brand or product changes in price but they're also least responsive to aggregate changes in alcohol prices.

Finally, ANPHA look at some evidence from Canadian experiments with social reference pricing. At page 16, they cite evidence from British Columbia where a 10% increase in alcohol's minimum price resulted in 3.4% reduction in aggregate consumption: again, a finding consistent with the numbers I'm citing, and not consistent with Connor's.

ANPHA cite a bunch of other Sheffield simulation results showing relative price inelasticity but greater simulated total consumption changes among harmful drinkers than among moderate drinkers. Simulation results here are going to be pretty sensitive to parameter estimates, but it's also the case that a smaller percentage consumption reduction among heavy drinkers than among moderate drinkers can easily generate larger total consumption decreases among heavy drinkers.

The ANPHA issues paper doesn't make policy recommendations; it just looks at issues around minimum pricing. But they do include in their appendix a paragraph noting their prior recommendation: that alcohol move to a tiered volumetric tax that looks an awful lot like New Zealand's current system where spirits are more heavily taxed per unit alcohol than beer and wine, which are more heavily taxed per unit alcohol than low-alcohol products. I'm not endorsing the ANPHA paper or its recommendations,** but its survey around the price elasticity of demand is pretty much what I've been finding in my own searches through the literature. And I can't find anything in it that would support suggestions that alcohol consumption is relatively price elastic to regulated minimum prices.

I'd love to know where Connor's getting her elasticity estimates. They are completely outside of any plausible range. Again there is not a single paper among the 112 papers cited by Wagenaar that comes within cooie of the numbers she's suggesting would here apply; not a single one finds that aggregate alcohol demand is relatively elastic. O'Connor's suggesting an absolute price elasticity of demand of 1.16 1.6. Zero of the 112 cited by Wagenaar finds an absolute elasticity greater than 1. ANPHA does not cite a single finding suggesting an absolute elasticity greater than 1. Maybe there's a study out there somewhere that supports it, but I'd be awfully uncomfortable being cited in the press using number that are that far out of whack from the rest of the literature.

Finally, Connor says that minimum pricing targets heavy drinkers the most. It's true that they'll take the biggest dollar hit from an increase in minimum prices. But they are still less responsive relative to their consumption than are moderate drinkers. Imagine, for instance, claiming that rich fat people are most affected by a 100% tax on food because they wind up having the biggest increase in what they spend on food. Yeah, it's true. But the smaller absolute reduction in the quantity consumed by poor thin people matters too, especially if they cut their consumption by a much larger proportion than do the rich folks.

UPDATE: I've found the study Connor is citing, or at least I think I have. And, I think it's the same one that ANPHA is citing. Remember how I noted at the start that you have to be careful to look at aggregate changes rather than just own-price? Well, ANPHA was careful about that. Connor is citing the figure from the same study that looks only at what happens to, say, beer consumption if you hike the price of beer while leaving the price of wine constant. Suppose Honda increased the price of its cars 10% and we saw a 16% drop in Honda sales as consumers shifted to Toyotas; it would be a bit nuts to sell that as saying that a 10% tax on all cars would reduce aggregate car purchases by 16%. Here's the original paper:
The estimates indicate that a 10% increase in the minimum price of a given type of beverage [EC: eg, spirits, beer, wine] reduced consumption of that type by about 16.1% relative to all other beverages, and a simultaneous 10% increase in the minimum prices of all types reduced total consumption by 3.4% (p<0.01 in both cases). The first estimate may overestimate minimum price effects because  it incorporates compensatory increases in consumption of all other beverages. The estimate of the effect of across-the-board changes in minimum prices on total consumption will be biased to the extent that the extra structure we imposed on the model is unrealistic. 
Connor has to have been misquoted here or the journalists left out a couple of subsequent clarifying sentences. The error is in the press release. Oh dear.

Previously:

*Note that I've been citing -0.44: mean elasticity across all the estimates is -0.51, but Wagenaar gives -0.44 for total alcohol after adjustment for study characteristics.

** In particular, arguments around increasing the price of the lowest-cost products in Australia, where the WET means that cask wine can be very cheap, just don't translate to the New Zealand environment where we already have a tiered volumetric excise regime. I also am far more sceptical of results coming from Sheffield's simulation work than they seem to be.