Owners of earthquake-prone buildings now have a bit more time to bring them up to spec. The owners are mad because they say it isn't long enough; people who experienced Christchurch are mad because buildings will still fall on people and kill them in another quake. They could both be right.
It is perfectly plausible that there are buildings that need never be compelled to be brought up to 33% of new building code. Imagine a building in the middle of nowhere, with no nearby pedestrian traffic, and occupied only by those who know about the risk or who are well-advised about it by a sign at the doorway. There is no reason for the government there to get involved, or at least no reason that comes from economics. People can trade off cost and beauty against risk - that's allowed. And so a national rule that forces the owner of such a building to make costly investments to bring it up to code imposes cost in excess of benefit. The owner either will sink money into the building where it isn't warranted, or he will demolish the building that he otherwise would prefer to keep.
On the other hand, imagine a building in downtown Wellington with an unreinforced masonry facade. Everyone in the building knows about the risk and accepts it in exchange for lower rental rates or enhanced amenities on other margins. And that's all fine. But passers-by on the sidewalk and buses driving by on the street have uncompensated risk forced upon them. While the owner will there rightly claim that it does not pass his cost-benefit analysis quickly to bring the building up to 33% of code, he is not accounting for the costs he is imposing, probabilistically, on every passer by. It can easily be the case that, when accounting for the risk of death he is imposing on each person walking past his building, upgrading the building or demolishing it would pass cost-benefit. But he does not care about the costs imposed on others. The new rule is too lax in this case.
What then is an optimal rule? We'd need some way of accounting for the true risk that a building imposes. That risk depends not only on structural features of the building but also on the building's surroundings. And it would be pretty hard for central government to be able to come up with a clean rule. As we saw in Christchurch after the September quake, City Council had a rule in place requiring the closure of footpaths adjacent to risky buildings; Council interpreted the rule in perverse ways. Instead of blocking busy Colombo Street, Council decided that the engineers must have meant that 605-613 Colombo imposed risk instead on tiny alleyway beside the building. And then the building fell on a bus and killed a bunch of people and left Ann Brower to work out the series of spectacular regulatory failures that led to her being the only survivor on that bus.
There's an easier way. Honestly, we do not know when another quake will come or which buildings will collapse. Engineers can put up widely varying assessments of the true structural risk imposed by a building. What do we do when faced with this kind of uncertainty? Impose a liability rule. Instead of giving building owners 15-20 years to get their buildings up to 33% of the new building code, give them five years to get an engineering assessment, to put a safety letter grade prominently at the door, and to get liability insurance. At the end of the five year period, have every building owner liable for damages for every person killed or injured if their building falls down on passers-by. There should not be liability for deaths and injuries incurred by persons inside the building: we can and do voluntarily assume some risks, and we should not prevent people from taking on those kinds of risks. But if your building falls down and squishes a bus, you should be liable for the deaths of each of the people inside of that bus.
The Ministry of Transport currently sets the Value of a Statistical Life in New Zealand at $3.77 million. That's arguably too low, but it's a great benchmark: arguing about $3.77 million versus the $5 million or so you'd get from a back-of-the-envelope application of revealed-preference measures from the United States to New Zealand, accounting for the income elasticity of safety preferences and differences in income across the two countries is second order. First order is getting a consistent benchmark across different regulatory and liability sectors.
A building owner potentially liable for $3.77 million in damages paid to the estates of those who his building kills will adequately take their interests into account in deciding whether to fix up his building. It would not be that hard to require that building owners carry insurance sufficient for paying such liability claims, or to prove assets sufficient for covering the potential liability. If you've got a building in the middle of nowhere with no passers-by, your insurance premiums will be very small. You then will make the optimal choice and not upgrade your building. If you've got a brick-facade building in downtown Wellington, you'll have to weigh up the costs of insurance against the cost of fixing the place up.
Right now, we are in the worst of all possible worlds. Building owners face neither liability for the risk their buildings impose on those outside their buildings, nor any sufficient regulatory regime to ensure that owners are making appropriate investments in ensuring that their buildings do not impose excessive risk on passers-by. This is why Wellington scares the hell out of me. It's pretty, and I love seeing the old buildings that we no longer have, but they terrify me. I have absolutely no confidence that even really rather dodgy buildings are getting the attention they deserve.
Were the Government to have any interest in implementing a regime such as that described above, I'd recommend one further change. Flip the heritage building regulations around such that heritage boards have zero regulatory power but instead get an annual budget. Owners of risky heritage buildings should be free to demolish them if that's what make sense, given the risk they impose and the cost of upgrading them. Heritage boards' main role should be the payment of annual stipends to owners of heritage buildings for the provision of heritage amenities. Give them a generous budget, funded partially by local Council, partially by central government, and with ample provision for voluntary donation from the public. Let them decide, within that budget, where they can do best by spending money. And then just let go of the rest.
I will absolutely hate saying "I freaking told you so" after Wellington gets a big quake in which unreinforced masonry winds up killing a bunch of people needlessly.
And, in anticipation of the likely critique: yes, I am here absolving building owners from liability for those who chose to be inside their buildings. But current policy absolves them of that liability for those both inside and outside.
Previously:
Showing posts with label Heritage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Heritage. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
Thursday, March 7, 2013
Spreading the burden
The Christchurch Earthquake has the government looking at earthquake standards for older buildings. This could all wind up being rather expensive.
Let's start with an easy case: your own owned house set back in a yard. If you own the house and live in it, it should be your own business as you're bearing the risk. Maybe we can complicate it where we think that people are bad at thinking about these kinds of risks, but even then it's hard to make a case for doing anything beyond requiring engineering reports on the houses, putting the information on the LIM, and maybe putting a little warning sign at the door for houses found to be particularly risky so that visitors know what they're getting into.
Let's complicate it a bit. You have a two-story brick townhouse built abutting the sidewalk: if the facade comes down, your house will kill people. What standard should there apply? The people inside own the house and have come to their own assessment of the risk, but not so the people on the sidewalk. Or the people in buses traveling down the street beside it. Ideally, we'd want earthquake reinforcement up to the point where the cost of an additional unit of safety provided is equal to the expected cost of the risk imposed: the likelihood of the facade coming down multiplied by the damage done if it does. How can we set a rule that induces the appropriate cost internalisation? Here, I'd expect we do best by relying on insurance: require building owners imposing this kind of risk to carry liability insurance sufficient to pay the current value of a statistical life for each person killed by their building in case of earthquake. In a competitive insurance market, premiums for this policy will reflect the actual value of the risk imposed, and building owners will then have incentive to make improvements that are cost-effective. And given how insurers have behaved since the 2011 earthquakes, we'd likely need some very bright-line rules about which bits of sidewalk count as being which building's problem. We'd possibly also need stock and pillory for insurance officials wanting to spend years arguing the toss about whether a stone from one building is what pushed the victim into another building's zone.
Let's add a further complication: the house is heritage listed and the owners are prohibited from making improvements that would detract from the heritage amenity provided, or at least it's awfully hard. Upgrading these buildings isn't going to be cheap. Heritage amenities are real; there is a real case for local government subsidy of these amenities. But we really need to shift to having that amenity be guaranteed by annual on-budget payments going to those providing the heritage amenity rather than mandates around permissible building modifications.*
What about rental properties? There, I can see a decent case for requiring the engineering reports on suspect properties, along with mandates that a simple version of the report be made available to tenants about the property's real risks. It would certainly be the case that there would be some low-rent buildings that are pretty risky. But it would also be the case that the tenants there preferred living in the riskier building than paying the higher rent for an upgraded building: I'd be rather surprised if upgrading costs imposed on landlords through mandates didn't wind up being passed through as higher rents. It's easy to make the sad-story case of someone 'forced' by poverty to choose a lower quality rental building and how we need to consequently mandate tight standards, but solving that with building regs is just a form of trying to solve an income problem with a price control. If we cared about getting more lower-income rental properties to market, we'd be easing back on the zoning controls that inflate the price of land.
Commercial properties or those visited by the general public are a bit more complicated. The risks of entering any particular building are far from obvious. There are three basic potential approaches. We could mandate adherence to some standard. We could use a liability rule making the building owner liable for deaths caused by his building falling on those inside (requiring insurance sufficient to cover the liability, as suggested above for streetside homes). Or, we could inform those entering the building of the building's risk by way of "Earthquake Grade" signs mimicking the restaurant grades.
But standards are insufficiently sensitive to actual imposed risk.
And liability rules would prove really rather expensive for any building that often hosts a large number of people - it's very easy to imagine that many people would voluntarily, and in full knowledge of the risk, choose to enter a building that would have been demolished as too expensive to insure under a liability rule. We only want a liability rule where we think that people are incapable of making rational risk assessments when in possession of full information about the risks, or where it's exceedingly expensive to provide that information. But they should beat nation-wide regulation where different parts of the country have different actual earthquake risk.
Finally, I'd expect that locals would quickly figure out how much weight to put on Red/Yellow/Green-light earthquake risk signs. When I was up at a conference in Wellington last year, the building had a big "Earthquake risk" sticker on it. Had I known at the outset that the Law & Economics Association was choosing to host his event in such a place, I'd have declined to attend - I am rather disinclined to walk into any brick unreinforced building in Wellington barring very large side-payment. Online maps of earthquake building risks would quickly sort things out.
There's a good case for having liability rules or standards for buildings that the public is forced to attend by the state: courtrooms, prisons, public licensing offices and the like. We can't use a revealed preference argument around risk acceptance for those venues. But for other buildings where entry is voluntary, what's wrong with mandating signs advising the public that "Engineering assessment suggests this building has (very low, below average, average, above average, seriously high risk) of falling down in case of earthquake. Entry is at own risk."
I'd expect that optimal policy would mandate liability insurance for risks imposed on passers-by, regulation for buildings whose collapse would block essential traffic routes (or, equivalently, liability equal to the full actual cost imposed in such case, with insurance premia then doing the work), and warning signs for entry into buildings.
It would make me awfully sad if Oamaru's historic district had to be torn down to meet earthquake regs where Oamaru's actual risk perhaps isn't all that high. Competitive insurance quotes could sort that out more effectively than can nationwide regulation.
* And if you've not been following the utter madness in Christchurch, read this and weep. Because their destroyed house was in a heritage zone, all the heritage from which is now flattened and gone, this couple is banned from putting up the house they want on their property [article, editorial]. The planners won't revisit the heritage zone regs until 2014-2015. As for the dictatorship downtown...
So, how much strengthening is enough?A former adviser to the Reserve Bank and World Bank says the cost of bringing in tougher tests for earthquake-prone buildings would far outweigh the benefits.Economic consultant Ian Harrison said he had analysed proposals put forward by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment on building standards, and it showed the cost of the tougher regime would be 50 times the benefits.In Auckland the cost was 1762 times the benefit.
Let's start with an easy case: your own owned house set back in a yard. If you own the house and live in it, it should be your own business as you're bearing the risk. Maybe we can complicate it where we think that people are bad at thinking about these kinds of risks, but even then it's hard to make a case for doing anything beyond requiring engineering reports on the houses, putting the information on the LIM, and maybe putting a little warning sign at the door for houses found to be particularly risky so that visitors know what they're getting into.
Let's complicate it a bit. You have a two-story brick townhouse built abutting the sidewalk: if the facade comes down, your house will kill people. What standard should there apply? The people inside own the house and have come to their own assessment of the risk, but not so the people on the sidewalk. Or the people in buses traveling down the street beside it. Ideally, we'd want earthquake reinforcement up to the point where the cost of an additional unit of safety provided is equal to the expected cost of the risk imposed: the likelihood of the facade coming down multiplied by the damage done if it does. How can we set a rule that induces the appropriate cost internalisation? Here, I'd expect we do best by relying on insurance: require building owners imposing this kind of risk to carry liability insurance sufficient to pay the current value of a statistical life for each person killed by their building in case of earthquake. In a competitive insurance market, premiums for this policy will reflect the actual value of the risk imposed, and building owners will then have incentive to make improvements that are cost-effective. And given how insurers have behaved since the 2011 earthquakes, we'd likely need some very bright-line rules about which bits of sidewalk count as being which building's problem. We'd possibly also need stock and pillory for insurance officials wanting to spend years arguing the toss about whether a stone from one building is what pushed the victim into another building's zone.
Let's add a further complication: the house is heritage listed and the owners are prohibited from making improvements that would detract from the heritage amenity provided, or at least it's awfully hard. Upgrading these buildings isn't going to be cheap. Heritage amenities are real; there is a real case for local government subsidy of these amenities. But we really need to shift to having that amenity be guaranteed by annual on-budget payments going to those providing the heritage amenity rather than mandates around permissible building modifications.*
What about rental properties? There, I can see a decent case for requiring the engineering reports on suspect properties, along with mandates that a simple version of the report be made available to tenants about the property's real risks. It would certainly be the case that there would be some low-rent buildings that are pretty risky. But it would also be the case that the tenants there preferred living in the riskier building than paying the higher rent for an upgraded building: I'd be rather surprised if upgrading costs imposed on landlords through mandates didn't wind up being passed through as higher rents. It's easy to make the sad-story case of someone 'forced' by poverty to choose a lower quality rental building and how we need to consequently mandate tight standards, but solving that with building regs is just a form of trying to solve an income problem with a price control. If we cared about getting more lower-income rental properties to market, we'd be easing back on the zoning controls that inflate the price of land.
Commercial properties or those visited by the general public are a bit more complicated. The risks of entering any particular building are far from obvious. There are three basic potential approaches. We could mandate adherence to some standard. We could use a liability rule making the building owner liable for deaths caused by his building falling on those inside (requiring insurance sufficient to cover the liability, as suggested above for streetside homes). Or, we could inform those entering the building of the building's risk by way of "Earthquake Grade" signs mimicking the restaurant grades.
But standards are insufficiently sensitive to actual imposed risk.
And liability rules would prove really rather expensive for any building that often hosts a large number of people - it's very easy to imagine that many people would voluntarily, and in full knowledge of the risk, choose to enter a building that would have been demolished as too expensive to insure under a liability rule. We only want a liability rule where we think that people are incapable of making rational risk assessments when in possession of full information about the risks, or where it's exceedingly expensive to provide that information. But they should beat nation-wide regulation where different parts of the country have different actual earthquake risk.
Finally, I'd expect that locals would quickly figure out how much weight to put on Red/Yellow/Green-light earthquake risk signs. When I was up at a conference in Wellington last year, the building had a big "Earthquake risk" sticker on it. Had I known at the outset that the Law & Economics Association was choosing to host his event in such a place, I'd have declined to attend - I am rather disinclined to walk into any brick unreinforced building in Wellington barring very large side-payment. Online maps of earthquake building risks would quickly sort things out.
There's a good case for having liability rules or standards for buildings that the public is forced to attend by the state: courtrooms, prisons, public licensing offices and the like. We can't use a revealed preference argument around risk acceptance for those venues. But for other buildings where entry is voluntary, what's wrong with mandating signs advising the public that "Engineering assessment suggests this building has (very low, below average, average, above average, seriously high risk) of falling down in case of earthquake. Entry is at own risk."
I'd expect that optimal policy would mandate liability insurance for risks imposed on passers-by, regulation for buildings whose collapse would block essential traffic routes (or, equivalently, liability equal to the full actual cost imposed in such case, with insurance premia then doing the work), and warning signs for entry into buildings.
It would make me awfully sad if Oamaru's historic district had to be torn down to meet earthquake regs where Oamaru's actual risk perhaps isn't all that high. Competitive insurance quotes could sort that out more effectively than can nationwide regulation.
* And if you've not been following the utter madness in Christchurch, read this and weep. Because their destroyed house was in a heritage zone, all the heritage from which is now flattened and gone, this couple is banned from putting up the house they want on their property [article, editorial]. The planners won't revisit the heritage zone regs until 2014-2015. As for the dictatorship downtown...
Friday, June 1, 2012
VSL and earthquakes [updated]
Bill Kaye-Blake starts running the cold calculus on the weight we ought put on earthquake safety.
Give it a few years so that we don't run into construction capacity constraints with the Christchurch rebuild, or import a pile of European and American unemployed builders on two-year work visas.
* Update: Bill corrected an error in his original figures - the relatively low risk of earthquakes makes the efficient level of expenditure lower. That also makes the actuarialy fair insurance levies lower.
The faster we move towards a liability regime, the better. Announce that, as of a five years from now, building owners will need to carry liability insurance for potential fatalities caused by their buildings. Insurers will set premiums to reflect building-specific risk. Owners then weigh the ongoing insurance cost against the cost of repairs and rebuilds. At the same time, switch from regulatory heritage preservation to local councils' paying annual subsidies for provision of heritage amenities.That is, given the known risks of earthquake, we should be willing over the next 50 years to invest over$5 billion$26om on earthquake safety in order to save the lives of people in Wellington. If we think that saving all those lives is impossible (which it likely is), then we can scale the total back. For 1,000 lives saved, the amount is$3.5 billion$175m. This calculation doesn’t say anything about the 13,000 injured however. They need to be added in, too.This is an example of an explicit cost-benefit analysis of the trade-offs we might be willing to make. We can spend some money to make buildings safer and save lives, or we can spend it on other things that also have value (health, education, and margaritas).Dear reader, before you accuse me of being a heartless economist, let me point out that decision-makers are already making this trade-off.
Give it a few years so that we don't run into construction capacity constraints with the Christchurch rebuild, or import a pile of European and American unemployed builders on two-year work visas.
* Update: Bill corrected an error in his original figures - the relatively low risk of earthquakes makes the efficient level of expenditure lower. That also makes the actuarialy fair insurance levies lower.
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