Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label monetary policy. Show all posts

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Green Money

There is a time and place for non-traditional monetary policy mechanisms.

In a world in which deflationary pressures are strong and the Reserve Bank has hit the zero-bound on interest rates, then standard monetarist macroeconomics and the new monetarists would recommend doing other things increase inflationary expectations. Standard theory tends to expect problems in worlds combining nominal wage rigidity and deflation. And if the Reserve Bank can't accommodate with nominal interest rate cuts, then things like quantitative easing - or money-printing - start being recommended. If you're keen on the debates around this kind of macroeconomics, start reading Scott Sumner, Stephen Williamson, Nick Rowe, and the macroblogs. Nolan at TVHE more frequently covers this too; I generally try to stay out of macro.

So "printing money", per se, isn't utterly insane. It can be a pretty mainstream response to a very particular and fairly rare set of circumstances. Not all macroeconomists agree about it, but it's within the mainstream for the set of circumstances that held in some parts of the world over the last few years. But not today's New Zealand.

While we're currently below the bottom end of the RBNZ's target range, that is not going to last. If the RBNZ thought it would, they could and would lower interest rates further. But they're not doing it. Why? Construction pressures are pushing up in the non-tradeable sector. Further, the depreciation that would come consequent to any serious monetary push, whether from printing money or from big interest rate cuts, would push up import prices and then put more pressure on inflation rates. They're targeting 1-3% over the medium term and seem on track to be there. iPredict has medium term inflation looking to be under 2%, but over 1%.

And so the debates over the Greens' "let's print money to pay for the earthquake" policy have been a bit disappointing.

First off, the Greens have been spectacularly wrong when they've argued that their policy can't be all bad because so many other places are running quantitative easing. Imagine a doctor prescribing a pretty aggressive chemotherapy treatment for a patient who only has a cold. When everybody says he's nuts, the doc replies "Well, Jim over there's on chemo, and it seems to be helping him!" There's a time and a place for aggressive chemotherapy and for quantitative easing; NZ right now isn't it.

On the other side, there's been a bit of overstatement claiming that it can never be consistent with standard macro to print money. But I did enjoy The Civilian's caricature.

Finally, rather than admit that they were really wrong, the Greens instead pulled back from their policy by saying they couldn't see getting sufficient support for getting QE through - like it's everybody else's fault for thinking that doctors shouldn't jump for chemothearapy for colds.

I hate how economic models prescribing particular corrective interventions for particular sets of conditions get used to justify those policies in every other state of the world. Keynes said to run deficits during recessions; politics turned that into running deficits all the time. Market failure theory says we might want Pigovean taxes for costs people impose on others; politics turns that into excise taxes for costs people impose upon themselves. And then there's Russel Norman.

UPDATE: I totally do not want to be slamming Russel Norman if he's changed his mind about the merits of QE under the current circumstances rather than the political feasibility of QE under the current circumstances. Any politician who changes his views on the basis of the evidence should be lauded for the change rather than condemned for U-Turns.

@Davidxvx points me to Wednesday's ODT:
Dr Norman supported money printing as devaluing the currency, as the United States and Britain had done, saying at the time that "New Zealand can no longer afford to be a pacifist in a currency war".
Asked if he still supported the policy, he said the consensus position was that while the official cash rate remained close to zero (it is 2.5) there was not a clear role for quantitative easing.
"But were the OCR to drop close to zero then QE would come back into the agenda."
In that circumstance he believed the Reserve Bank Governor would look at quantitative easing - as he actually can now.
If the cited consensus is that among economists that you don't run QE when at NZ's current position, and that he's reversed because that's what professionals who work in the area think, then I offer enthusiastic applause.

But I think that Norman is misreading international monetary policy. QE may have had the effect of devaluing the US dollar, but its purpose was to raise inflation expectations and to avoid a liquidity trap. And even places like Switzerland, which has run some active exchange rate targeting, have done it not to boost exports or make manufacturers happy but rather because devaluation can be a way of escaping from a liquidity trap. Devaluing is something you can do to loosen monetary policy at the zero bound. And, again, New Zealand is nowhere near the zero bound.

I wish that the NZ Greens would take a more interesting monetary policy position, if a Green party is determined to have a position on monetary policy. Imagine Russel Norman commissioning a few reputable academic macroeconomists to look at whether NGDP targeting would make sense in a small open economy, then just adopting whatever came of it. I'm not convinced that NGDP targeting would be much better than our current regime, but it's defensible. It's something potentially backed by a growing group of respectable macroeconomists. It can't be dismissed as simple money-printing. And it would give nice talking points about using monetary policy more actively to support the economy during downturns than we might expect in an inflation-targeting regime.

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Inflation expectations

Bill Kaye-Blake notes the macroeconomic consequences of the delayed Christchurch rebuild, and wonders whether we consequently should have more stimulatory monetary policy:
First, I could see the logic in the plan. Austerity for reasons of national economic policy — reducing the debt, placating overseas money markets — while getting some Keynesian intervention through Christchurch. Secondly, it didn’t work. It became clear in 2011 that it wasn’t working. Nevertheless, the Government stuck with the plan longer than I think they should have, and longer than the state of the economy warranted.
He puts up graphs showing RBNZ estimates have been optimistic relative to experienced reality for the last several quarters, that core CPI has been low, and that unemployment remains high.

I'm happy to agree with Bill that the stalled rebuild had macro consequences, as well as the general awfulness for folks stuck in very poor housing. But let's have a look at some inflation expectations.

I'm here drawing from iPredict's quarterly markets on inflation rates. The table below has the risk of inflation outcomes above 3% and below 1%, based on the price of shares in the relevant markets.

QuarterProbability inflation
less than 1%
Median expected
rate
Probability inflation
greater than 3%
March 201384%Less than 1%
1%
June 201323%Between 1% and 2%
5%
September 201334%Between 1% and 2%
10%
December 201315%Between 1% and 2%
15%
March 201418%Between 1% and 2%
19%

Inflation risks look pretty balanced over the medium term.

The markets are also expecting no change in the OCR in any quarter through the end of the forecasting horizon. The greatest likelihood of any change is a 21% chance of an 25bp increase in December 2013, though the markets also are pegging pretty stagnant GDP growth rates and an unemployment rate unlikely to drop below 6% before September quarter 2013.

You could maybe justify a small cut to the OCR on that risks currently should be weighted towards breaching the top rather than the bottom of the bound, and on that the median expected rate converges to a shade below 2% rather than a shade above it. But it's hard to see much case for that RBNZ has been grievously tight when they're targeting a medium term.

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Paying for earthquakes

Matt Nolan walks us through why quantitative easing to pay for the Christchurch Rebuild isn't particularly good policy. If we need a monetary push, the place to start is interest rates - and then only if RBNZ thinks we're going to be below the 1% lower inflation bound over the medium term. If we need a fiscal push, which is highly debatable, doing it through earthquake spending might not be as helpful as the Greens might like - especially as regulatory bottlenecks and regulatory capacity constraints in Christchurch seem to be holding things up at least as much as money.

Let's recall how standard public finance says to pay for things like earthquakes. If the status quo ex ante had about the right mix of spending and taxation, then you cut spending in non-earthquake areas, increase spending on earthquake rebuilding, perhaps slightly increase taxes in the short term but definitely take on debt to spread the rebuilding costs over the longer term. This is bog standard public finance. Paul Krugman and Steven Landsburg agree. I walked through the argument slowly a while back.

What do we get if the government prints earthquake bonds and RBNZ prints money to buy them? Here's Nolan:
Now you may believe we should fund the rebuild with a one-off tax – that’s fine, in that case get the government to put a tax in place directly (or to directly cut spending from other place).  However, taxation by stealth of this sort is likely to be worse in multiple ways:
  1. We have betrayed RBNZ independence for virtually no reason … understandably a sneak tax by the RBNZ would make people less likely to believe them in the future about holding to their inflation mandate.  As a result, we run into the time-consistency issue in monetary policy again, and it will become more painful for economy when the RBNZ tries to commit to its inflation mandate again.
  2. We have a relatively rough redistribution of resources due to this.  By putting in our sneak tax through QE, we transfer resources to those with assets, those doing the rebuild, and those who can easily adjust prices/wages – while hurting those on fixed income, and those who have saved.  It is an inflation tax – pure and simple – and as a result, it will initially transfer resources from those who can’t protect themselves (generally the poor) to those who can (generally the rich).  If we introduce the tax through fiscal policy instead we can sort out these distributional issues a little better.
  3. A country that is willing to introduce QE as a clear fiscal transfer – when there is no monetary policy reason – will destroy its credibility with international lenders.  People will scoff at this, but such a policy will increase the level of “inflation insurance” lenders ask for – increasing the cost of credit in New Zealand.
These are obvious and true costs, that have been seen from similar policies around the world for hundreds of years.  QE really isn’t anything new, and if we want a fiscal transfer of this sort just say it (as the Greens previously have to be fair), and do it through fiscal policy – it has nothing to do with the RBNZ.
I suspect Matt's "that's fine" at the start is more recognition that the policy at least is honest rather than that it's a good idea. Borrowing for major one-off capital expenditures is far better than a one-off tax.

Matt's also a little harsher about those peddling crank economics than he's usually willing to go:
The constant banging on about the exchange rate and the RBNZ shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the “issues” NZ faces.
The Greens, and Ganesh Nana, are wrong in stating that the RBNZ has failed.  Distinctly and totally wrong.
I approve.

Bernard Hickey was calling on Twitter last week for a review of the desirability of central bank independence. Matt and I got a bit testy. This is one of those issues where re-politicising whether the central bank should be independent has almost the same effect as removing independence: if RBNZ believes that its independence is conditional not on meeting the PTA but rather on making a mob of monetary cranks happy, then it might be tempted to start skewing its policy. And even if it doesn't, if people think it might be, that also starts wrecking expectations. There's reasonable latent public demand for bad monetary policy. Feeding and encouraging the trolls is a remarkably dangerous game. It's fine to debate what optimal monetary policy is. But suggesting that because RBNZ isn't following your preferred one, we ought reconsider central bank independence... that's intellectual vandalism on par with saying we should do away with Pharmac because you didn't like the Herceptin decision. In sum:

  • Good: trying to convince RBNZ of your views on monetary policy.
  • Bad: whipping up the hooples to break central bank independence.